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Physician Unions and the Future of Competition
INTRODUCTION
The 1990s were hard on doctors. The ascendancy of managed
care meant lower pay, a loss of clinical control and markedly di-
minished economic power. By the middle of the decade, it had
become clear that managed care's effects were not going to be lim-
ited to a few isolated markets. In 1994, physician income actually
declined on a nationwide basis,' and researchers were predicting a
2surplus of 165,000 physicians within the following five years.
While doctors' incomes are rising once again and dire predic-
tions of physician oversupply have yet to materialize, physicians
remain intensely concerned about their economic future. With a
recent wave of health maintenance organization ("HMO") con-
solidation, independent doctors feel increasingly vulnerable to
exploitation in negotiations over fee schedules and other terms of
provider contracts.3 The American Medical Association ("AMA"),
once the proud and effective embodiment of organized medicine,
has been largely powerless to stop the erosion of professional pre-
rogatives at the hands of market forces.!
Worse yet, in the eyes of many doctors, market-based medicine
adds moral insult to economic injury. While medical practitioners
have struggled to maintain their incomes, business executives at
some managed care organizations ("MCOs") watched their earn-
ings soar to levels far exceeding even the most highly trained spe-
See Carol J. Simon & Patricia H. Born, Physician Earnings in a Changing Managed Care
Environment, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 125. See generally Carol J. Simon et al., The Effect of
Managed Care on the Incomes of Primay Care and Specialty Physicians, 33 HEALTH SERVs REs. 549
(1998) (evaluating managed care's effects on market demand for, and income of, primary
care physicians, hospital-based specialists, and medical subspecialists).
' See J.P. Weiner, Forecasting the Effects of Health Reform on U.S. Physician Workforce Re-
quirement: Evidence fiom HMO Staffing Patterns, 272JAMA 222,222 (1994).
s See Negotiating Pmtetion for Healthcare Prvider: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House
Judiciaiy Comm., 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999) (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson,Jr., M.D.,
Executive Vice President, American Medical Association) (describing mergers and acquisi-
tions in HMO industry and specific instances of health plan power in local markets); see also
i& (statement of Hon. Joseph M. Hoeffel) (same).
4 Indeed, the AMA's recent decision to establish Physicians for Responsible Negotia-
tion, a collective bargaining organization, was apparently the result of grassroots concern
over possible membership losses to labor unions actively recruiting physician members. See
generally Steven Greenhouse, A.M.A.'s Delegates Vote to Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at
Al (describing physicians' need to unionize in order to negotiate effectively with HMOs);
Robert F. Leibenluft, Attempts of "Leve the Playing Field - - Deelopments in HMO Merger En-
forcement, Antitrust Exemptions and Physician Unions, HEALTH L. DIG., Aug. 1999, at 4, 12 (as-
cribing physicians' support of unionization to lack of bargaining power with HMOs).
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cialists'.5 It is as though the market's invisible hand is reaching
directly into the profession's collective pocketbook, illicitly trans-
ferring the hard-won fruits of professional labor to unworthy cor-
porate managers. A system that formerly heaped economic re-
wards upon its physicians on account of their undivided loyalty to
their patients' health now seems to reward corporate bureaucrats,
who specialize in cutting physician fees, burying doctors in moun-
tains of paperwork before they can be paid,6 and keeping patients
away from providers. Moreover, from the physicians' perspective,
the odds of getting a fair deal in the marketplace seem poor.
While MCOs can use the collective economic muscle of thousands
of consumers to extract concessions from individual doctors, anti-
trust laws prevent physicians from joining forces at the bargaining
table
In the face of these developments, it is no surprise that doctors
are fighting back. What is surprising, however, is that in addition
to mounting intense lobbying campaigns at all levels of govern-
ment and launching their own entrepreneurial projects, physicians
are increasingly joining labor unions. Since the first physician un-
ion was formed in 1957, some 35,000 American doctors have
joined unions." Although the significance of the labor movementamong physicians has so far been limited, there are a number of
5 The Health Administration Responsibility Project reports that the twenty-five highest-
paid HMO executives earned an aggregate of $153,778,303 in 1996, exclusive of unexercised
stock options. See Health Administration Responsibility Project, HMO Exeutive Salaries (vis-
ited Aug. 21, 1999) <http://www.harp.org/hmoexecs.htm> (on file with author). Stephen
Wiggins, then CEO of Oxford Health Plans and the highest paid HMO executive in the
nation, earned $29,061,599 in 1996 (including $1,741,599 in salary and bonus), and held
unexercised stock options then valued at $82,799,000. See id.; Ron Winslow, Wfggins, Ex-MO
of Oxford Health, Took 61% Cut in Total Pay Last Year, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1998, at B8. Mr.
Wiggins resigned in 1998 after Oxford suffered a loss of $291.3 million in 1997, receiving a
$9 million severance package, which the New York Insurance Department suspended two
days after its announcement. See Ron Winslow, Regulators Stop Oxford Ex-Chairman 's Severance,
WALL ST.J., Apr. 3, 1998, at B5.
6 See, e.g., AMA to Help Ensure Plan Pay Promptly, Am. MED. NEws, Jan. 11, 1999, at 17;
Gary Shepherd, HMO Fined for Low, Slow Pay, BUs. J., (Aug. 16, 1999) <http://www.amcity
.com/tampabay/stories/1999/08/16/storyl.html> (on file with author).
7 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (holding that
physicians' collective negotiation of fees constituted horizontal price-fixing); see also FrC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465-66 (1986) (refusing to permit individual den-
tists to defend antitrust conspiracy on ground that dentists' goals were consistent with state
policy); American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 529 (1943) (applying Sherman
Act to physicians notwithstanding their professional status).
' See Steven Greenhouse, Angered by H.M.O.'s Treatment, More Doctors AreJoining Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al; see also GRACE BUDRYS, WHEN DOCTORSJOIN UNIONS 11-15
(1997) (describing early physician union activity).
[Vol. 33:545
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reasons to think that physician unions may become an important
feature of American health care. First, the proportion of physi-
cians who are employees (and, thus, potentially eligible to partici-
pate in collective bargaining) has increased dramatically, from
24.2% in 1983 to 42.3% in 1994.9 Physician unions have tradition-
ally been associated with doctors that work for government or
teaching hospitals; the union doctor of the future is likely to be
employed full-time by an MCO.' ° Moreover, physician employment
is proliferating even outside captive clinics run by MCOs.' In addi-
tion, independent physicians are showing strong interest in union
organizing. While neither the courts nor the National Labor Rela-
tions Board ("NLRB") have shown much sympathy to unions com-
prised of independent doctors, the ultimate outcome of their un-
ionization efforts is far from certain. Not only does the potential
exist for some degree of unionization of independent physicians
under current law, but legislation has also been introduced that
would expressly permit them to engage in collective bargaining. 3
Union activity among physicians raises a number of significant
problems. First and foremost, widespread collective bargaining
would bring competition among physicians, especially price com-
petition, to an abrupt halt, resulting in dramatic increases in health
care costs. Legalized collective bargaining would permit physician
' See Phillip R. Kletke et al., Curent Trends in Physicians' Practice Arrangements: From
Owners to Employees, 276 JAMA 555, 557 (1996). A subsequent report estimates that as of
1998, 36% of all patient care physicians that were not federal employees and were not in
residency or fellowship training were employees. See DAVID W. EMMONS & PHIII2P R.
KL.ETKE, THE PRACrICE ARRANGEMENT OF PATIENT CARE PHYSICIANS 1998 (1999). Seventy-
six percent of the employed physicians were employed by institutions, and the remainder
were employees of physician-owned groups. See id Of the institutional employees, 27.2%
were employed by medical schools and universities, 10.1% by state and local government,
24.2% by hospitals, 7.3% by HMOs, 4.8% by ambulatory sites, and 26.3% by other employ-
ers. See id.
0 See genzy Andrea Adelson, Physicians, Unionize Thyself Doctors Adapt to Life as HMO
Emplroee N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at A2 (describing union organization by doctors em-
ployed by managed care company); Greenhouse, supra note 8, atAl (explaining physicians'
efforts to unionize); Jodie Morse, Unionizing the RR., TIME, July 5, 1999, at 62 (noting in-
creased physician union activity).
See EMMONS & KLETKE, supra note 9.
" See, e.g., United States v. Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Inc., 64
Fed. Reg. 5831 (Dep'tJustice 1999) (consent decree) (exemplifying settlement of antitrust
action involving physician groups); United States v. Federation of Physicians & Dentists, Inc.,
No. 98-475 (D. Del., filed August 12, 1998) (alleging that labor organization violated
Sherman Act in recruiting orthopedic surgeons); College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Puerto Rico, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 24,335 (D.P.R. Oct. 2, 1997) (exemplifying settle-
ment of antitrust action involving physician groups).
" See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
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unions to function as doctors' cartels, raising physician fees and
organizing professional boycotts of MCOs and other institutions
that might challenge professional authority in the name of con-
sumer interests. Such collective bargaining is utterly antithetical to
present American health policy, which has become progressively
more committed to markets and competition. 
4
Union proponents counter that competition is already in danger
because MCOs all too often enjoy disproportionate power in
health care markets. When MCOs use that power to extract below-
market prices from health professionals, consumers' economic
interests are damaged because service output and quality fall below
economically efficient levels. Union organizers assert that permit-
ting doctors to exercise countervailing economic power would re-
store balance to health care markets and ultimately benefit con-
sumers.
Surprisingly, physicians rarely make the distributive justice ar-
guments traditionally associated with labor organizing activity -
that they deserve greater organizing privileges because their wages
are too low or because they are forced to work in oppressive condi-
tions. Instead, they argue that unionization will benefit consum-
" See Lynn Etheredge, The Medicare Reforms of 1997: Headines You Didn't Read, 23 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L 573, 576 (1998) (arguing that recent Medicare reforms amount to
governmental endorsement of market-oriented health policy); cf Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Connell: Antitrut Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 604 (1976) ("Ihe anti-
trust laws are designed to promote competition, and unions, avowedly and unabashedly, are
designed to limit it. According to classical trade union theory, the objective is the elimina-
tion of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in the same industry.").
' Such distributive concerns are the primary reasons Congress has specifically author-
ized union activity notwithstanding its adverse effects on overall economic efficiency. See 29
U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (stating purposes of NLRA); see also ThomasJ. Campbell, Labor Law and
Economic, 38 STAN. L REV. 991,997-98 (1986); Douglas L Leslie, Princip/e of LaborAntitrust
66 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1185 (1980). Employed physicians that already have unionization rights
sometimes do make such claims, as do residents.
The chief sponsor of the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act, former Representative
Tom Campbell (R-CA), has argued that independent doctors should be able to unionize
because, like other workers, they provide an "intermediate service" to HMOs. See The Quality
Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998: Hearngs Before the House Committee on the Judicias, 105th
Cong. 2d Sess. (1998) (statement of Rep. Tom Campbell) [hereinafter Campbell State-
ment]. However, as FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky has noted, "[t]he labor exemption
already applies to health care professionals under the same standards that apply in other
sectors of the economy, that is, physicians who are employees... are already covered by the
labor exemption under the current law." See The Quality Health Cam Coalition Act of 1999.
Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciar (visited Apr. 23, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9906/ healthcaretestimony/htn> (statement of Robert Pitof-
sky, Federal Trade Commission Chairman) (on file with author). Likewise, intermediate
2000] Physician Unions and the Future of Competition 551
ers by strengthening the hand of doctors in protecting consumer
interests against HMO interference. This is a startling claim, be-
cause unions generally achieve their distributive goals at the ex-
pense of employers and consumers. 7 Physicians union advocates
might well respond that health care is a special case - one in
which consumers would benefit from union activity because it
would enhance physicians' bargaining power with health plans and
other institutions over important health care delivery decisions.
While many physicians are undoubtedly concerned about their
patients' health prospects under managed care,'8 this claim is
highly suspect. The medical profession was the de facto regulatory
authority in the health care industry from the early part of this cen-
tury until 1975, when it lost its antitrust exemption. During the
era of professional control, local medical societies routinely sup-
pressed private cost-containment efforts, resisted price competi-
tion, prevented the formation of MCOs, and boycotted other pro-
fessionals that threatened the competitive interests of the profes-
sion.20 Indeed, cost-saving managed care strategies would have
been nearly impossible to implement had the government not in-
voked the antitrust laws to stop physicians' anticompetitive con-
duct. Union status would allow physicians to recover much of their
former exemption from the antitrust laws, so that tactics used in
the past to suppress new mechanisms for health care delivery could
potentially be reintroduced.
service providers that are not employees are ineligible to bargain collectively even outside
the health care industry.
" See, e-g., H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. Ist Sess. (1999) (stating that purpose of legislation is
'[to] ensure and foster continued patient safety and quality of care"); Robert L. Weinmann,
Who Needs Doctor's Unions? (July 18, 1999) <http://www.uapd.com/press/nr0171999.hun>
("As more and more managed-care companies deny or delay benefits to patients, it becomes
increasingly necessary for patients and their doctors to have stronger voices at the negotiat-
ing table.") (on file with author).
SSee, -eg., Campbell, supra note 15, at 997-98 (observing tendency of unionization to
increase production costs).
" See Richard M. Scheffier, Physician Coective Bargaining A Turning Point in U.S. Medi-
cmne, 24J. HEALTH POL POL'Y& L 1071,1073-74 (1999) (characterizing physicians as unable
to exit from managed care system for moral and economic reasons and as turning to unions
and physician-controlled networks as mechanisms for making their voices heard). Other
nonwage factors, such as a perceived decline in decision making autonomy, may also be
motivating physicians' increased interest in union activity. See, e.g., Michael C. Burdi &
Lawrence C. Baker, Physicians' Percaptions of Autonomy and Satisfaction in Caifornia, HEALTH
AFF.,July/Aug. 1999, at 134 (finding decline in physician satisfaction).
See infa note 70 and accompanying texL
See infra text accompanying notes 69-77.
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The primary purpose of this Article is to evaluate physicians'
claims that consumers will benefit from increased physician un-
ionization. More generally, this Article provides an overview of the
law governing physician union activity and predicts the likely ef-
fects of physician union activity on health care markets.2' Part I
explains existing legal restrictions on collective bargaining by phy-
sicians that are not "employees." It also examines efforts to per-
suade courts, agencies, and legislatures to change the current law
to permit independent contractor physicians to bargain collectively
with payors. Part II raises the possibility that, notwithstanding ex-
isting restrictions, independent contractor physicians may be able
to engage in some degree of collective bargaining through partici-
pation in a "joint union" primarily composed of employed physi-
cians. Part III considers the degree to which physician unions may
lawfully engage in "proconsumer" collective bargaining, something
union proponents have promised to use their bargaining power to
do. Part IV analyzes the laws forbidding bargaining by physicians
deemed "managerial employees" or "supervisors." In each case,
analysis of the rules governing physician unionization is coupled
with predictions about the effects of the various rules on competi-
tion in health care markets.
I. UNIONIZATION AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR PHYSICIANS
A. The Right to Unionize
The law does not prevent any physician from joining a labor un-
ion.2 Under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") and re-
The competitive impact of unionization among residents and interns is unlikely to be
significant, so their status under the labor laws is not discussed here. See generally Richard B.
Gallagher, Annotation, Hospital House Staff Physicians as 'Employees" Under § 2(3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Ad, 57 A.LR. FED. 608 (1982 & Supp. 1999) (discussing union status of
resident physicians). Until recently, the NLRB had held that residents were not "employees"
but "students," and that they were thus ineligible for protection under the NLRA. See Ce-
dars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 223 N.LR.B. 251, 253 (1976). The NLRB has recently ruled that in-
terns and residents are entitled to bargain collectively under the NLRA. See Boston Med.
Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (Nov. 26, 1999); see also Michelle Amber, NLRB Rules that
Intern and Residents at Boston Medical Center Are Employees, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1862
(1999).
2 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994) (defining labor organization as "any organization of
any kind ... in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work") (emphasis added); see also NLRB v. Edward E.
Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 1948) ('Although the definition [of a labor
organization] requires that employees participate in the organization in order to make it a
[Vol. 33:545
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lated statutes, however, collective bargaining rights only accrue to
organizations that represent "employees."' As a result, a health
plan is not required to recognize a union attempting to bargain
collectively on behalf of nonemployee physicians; nor would such a
union be protected by the NLRA's prohibitions against other un-
fair labor practices. 4 In addition, the labor exemption to the anti-
trust laws does not generally apply to collective bargaining on be-
half of persons other than employees."s Thus, if independent phy-
sicians attempted to bargain collectively over fees with payors or
other institutions, their conduct would likely constitute a per se
illegal price-fixing conspiracy.2
In determining whether union members are employees for pur-
poses of the NLRA, courts draw on common-law agency princi-
ples." Relevant factors under the agency test include employer
labor organization, it does not require that the organization be composed exclusively of
employees.") (emphasis added). The E/ard K Budd court continued: "The fact that per-
sons other than employees are members of a labor organization does not prevent a labor
organization, which is otherwise qualified, from continuing to function." Id.
n See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (defining 'labor organization"). Employee union members
may use the collective bargaining process to negotiate over issues including wages and con-
ditions of employment. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Physicians, Unions and Antitrust 32 J.
HEALTH L 43, 50 (1999) ("Typically, employed physicians become interested in collective
bargaining when the employer. (1) sets goals for increased productivity without consulting
physicians about the likely impact of those goals on the quality of patient care; (2) makes
significant changes in the patient care facilities, staffing of the facilities, or administrative
procedures used in the facilities without consulting physicians; (3) demands reductions in
physician income; or (4) breaks promises or uses heavy handed techniques to force physi-
cians to make concessions."). Because independent physicians are ineligible to bargain
collectively, unions cannot help them deal with analogous issues presented in their relation-
ships with MCOs and other payors. However, unions can provide services such as legal
representation, research, and education. The Union of American Physicians and Dentists
("UAPD") has "develop[ed] a mechanism to secure contracts for fee-for-service members."
Union of American Physicians & Dentists, Private Pctice and IPA Information (visited Aug. 21,
1999) <http://www.uapd.com/ipa/ipa.hml> (on file with author). Some unions offer
.messenger model" PPO representation to their members. SeeJames C. Dechene, Prefened
Pomid Organizations, in HEALTH CARE CORPORATE LAW: MANAGED CARE § 2.14.1 (M. Hall &
W. Brewbaker eds., 1996 & Supp. 1999) (discussing messenger model of PPO pricing and
associated legal risks). The Justice Department recently alleged that one union's "messen-
ger model" PPO was a group boycott illegal under the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Fed'n of Physicians & Dentists, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 475, 477 (D. Del. 1998).
See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (enumerating unfair labor practices).
" See infia note 93.
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (holding that
physicians' collective negotiation of fees constituted horizontal price-fixing).
See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85,94 (1995); NLRB v. United Ins.
Co., 390 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1968). The application of the common-law test is a benchmark
against which a reviewing court will judge the reasonableness of NLRB determinations of
employee status; however, the Court has stated its intention to give the NLRB "considerable
deference" in interpreting the statutory definition of "employee." See Town &' Countr Eec.,
Una" of Cahfo ia, Davis [Vol. 33:545
control, the skill required in the particular occupation, who sup-
plies work instrumentalities, where the work is performed, and the
method of payment." Although the test usually focuses primarily
on "the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by
which the product is accomplished,"" no such emphasis governs
the analysis in the labor context3
Even though workers in high-skill occupations are usually pre-
sumed to be independent contractors, it is clear that physicians can
be employees under the NLRA.3' The NLRB and the courts have
recognized bargaining units composed of physicians that were full-
time employees of hospitals, university medical centers, medical
clinics, and HMOs." As a general rule, however, physicians that
maintain independent medical practices - selling services to self-
pay patients as well as to patients that may be insured under a vari-
516 U.S. at 94 ("In some cases there may be a question about whether the NLRB's departure
from the common law of agency with respect to particular questions and in a particular
statutory context, renders its interpretation unreasonable.").
SSee generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(aj) (1958) (outlining
factors relevant to determining if one is servant or independent contractor). The common-
law principles of agency have rarely been used to hold MCOs vicariously liable for the mal-
practice of physicians that are not their full-time employees. See generally William S. Brew-
baker III, Medical Malpractice and Managed Care Organizations: The Implied Warranty of Qualily,
60 LAw & CoNTEMP. Paons. 117, 141-49 (1997) (noting that historically respondeat superior
has rarely been applied in managed care litigation). But see Schleier v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, 876 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding staff-model HMO liable for malpractice of
nonemployee physician); Dunn v. Praiss, 606 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992),
(holding HMO liable for malpractice of nonemployee consulting physician), aff4 656 A.2d
413 (NJ. 1995).
See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989); ijf Robb
v. United States, 80 F.3d 884, 888 (4th Cir. 1996) (using common-law rules of agency to
determine whether physician was "independent contractor" for purposes of Federal Tort
Claims Act).
W See Roadway Package Sys., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 72, slip op. at 12 (Aug. 27, 1998) (9While
we recognize that the common-law agency test described by the Restatement ultimately
assesses the amount or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an individ-
ual, we find insufficient basis for the proposition that those factors which do not include the
concept of 'control' are insignificant when compared to those that do.").
" See, e.g., NewYork Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 405,411 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
that hospital committed unfair labor practice under NLRA by threatening union psychia-
trists); Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 88 F.3d 1300, 1305 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing
physicians as part of bargaining unit); Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Quecns, Inc. v.
NLRB, 620 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that hospital violated NLRA by refusing to
bargain with union that included physicians); North Gen. Hosp., 314 N.LR.B. 14, 15-18
(1994) (permitting physician employees to bargain collectively).
See, e-g., Thomas-Davis Med. Ctrs. v. NLRB, 157 F.3d 909,914 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that HMO clinic physicians are employees for purposes of NLRA); Thomas-Davis Med.
Ctrs., 324 N.L.R.B. 29, 30 (1997) (ordering HMO to bargain with physicians' union);
Montefiore Hosp., 261 N.LR.B. 569, 569 (1982) (recognizing physicians at teaching hospital
as employees under NLRA).
554
Physician Unions and the Future of Competition
ety of different health plans - are not considered employees and
are thus ineligible to bargain collectively under the NLRA. In ad-
dition, because antitrust law's labor exemption does not protect
unions of independent physicians, attempts at collective bargaining
may result in antitrust liability."
Independent physicians are now actively challenging the legal
barriers to collective bargaining. In AmerHealth Inc., " the United
Food and Commercial Workers Union petitioned the NLRB to
recognize a bargaining unit composed of 652 independent New
Jersey physicians.35 The NewJersey union had been formed for the
purpose of bargaining with AmeriHealth HMO.' Although the
petitioning physicians contracted, on average, with five or six other
payors in addition to AmeriHealth,37 and although forty percent of
the physicians were solo practitioners,' they nevertheless alleged
that the degree of control AmeriHealth exerted over their respec-
tive medical practices was sufficient to render them employees un-
der the NLRA.9 After the regional director dismissed the doctors'
initial petition,40 the NLRB remanded the case for a full factual
hearing in order to "provide a more complete picture of the day-to-
day interaction between the physicians and the HMOs"4' and de-
termine the degree to which HMOs control "the physicians' deliv-
ery of health care services and access to patients."42 Noting that
"the HMOs place certain conditions and restrictions on the physi-
cians which indicate that they do not have the independence nor-
mally associated with an independent contractor,"4 the NLRB ob-
served that the petition "involve[d] an important issue of first im-
pression."" On remand, the regional director again concluded
that the independent physicians were not AmeriHealth's employ-
e e supra note 7.
SeeAmeriHealth Inc./AmeriHealth HMO, No. 4 RC 196260 (May 25,1999).
See i& at 2.
w .i
se id at8.
S& i& at 9.
Se id. at 2.
See Letter from Dorothy L. Moore-Duncan, Regional Director, NLRB Region 4, to
Robert F. O'Brien, Esq. (Jan. 8,1998) (regarding AmeriHealth/AmeriHealth HMO) (on file
with author).




" I& at 1.
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ees, and that AmeriHealth would thus not be obligated to recog-
nize the union.
Although this ruling confirmed the conventional wisdom that
independent physicians are ineligible to bargain collectively with
payors, the NLRB's decision to remand for further fact finding is
nevertheless striking. Prior to the remand, the regional director
had already made extensive factual findings demonstrating the
economic independence of the physicians.G The NLRB's remand
order may thus signal some degree of openness to future efforts by
independent physicians to organize.r
* See Letter from Dorothy L. Moore-Duncan, Regional Director, NLRB Region 4, to
Robert F. O'Brien, Esq. (Jan. 1, 1998) (on file with author). The regional director found
that
Most significantly, the physicians themselves make the fundamental decisions that
determine the profitability of their practices. Thus, they retain the unfettered
right to decide matters as basic as whether they will be sole practitioners or enter
in to a group practice and whether to become affiliated with one or more HMOs.
In fact, AmeriHealth physicians generally contract with several HMOs that directly
compete with AmeriHealth and each other. Physicians spend only a minority of
their work time and derive a minority of their income from service to Ameri-
Health members. The physicians have virtually total control over their ex-
penses .... [T]he physicians determine the locations, contents and cost of their of-
fices, and they make significant capital investments in their medical and office
equipment. They also determine the number of staff members to employ and
their compensation, and they retain full supervisory authority over their employ-
ees. The physicians also can substantially affect their incomes.... [Tihe physi-
cians' professional judgment and efficiency will strongly influence their practices'
profitability.... AmeriHealth also does not provide fringe benefits, vacation, or
sick leave to physicians, nor make any deductions from the physicians' remunera-
tion.... Significantly, physicians have a full proprietary interest in their practices;
there is no evidence AmeriHealth can restrict them from expanding, contracting
or selling their practices or that it controls the organization and management of
the work performed in the physician's practices. Moreover, physicians' medical
practices hold themselves out to the public and advertise themselves under their
own names rather than doing business in AmeriHealth's name. All of these fac-
tors convincingly demonstrate that the physicians are independent contractors.
I& (citations omitted).
Indeed, although the NLRB denied review of the regional director's decision on
remand, it stated: "[WMe are not necessarily precluding a finding that physicians under
contract to health maintenance organizations may, in other circumstances, be found to be
statutory employees." AmeriHealth, Inc./AmeriHealth HMO, 329 N.LR.B. No. 76, slip op.
at I n.l (Oct. 18, 1999). The NLRB also stated that, contrary to the regional director, it
accord[s] little weight to the fact that AmeriHealth does not exercise sub-
stantial control with respect to the physicians' physical conduct in the per-
formance of services... since it is not customary in the medical profession
for fully trained staff physicians, including traditional staff physicians em-
ployed by hospitals or clinics, to be subject to substantial controls over the
manner in which they perform their professional duties.
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Independent contractor physicians are also working in the legis-
lative arena to secure collective bargaining rights. Texas recently
authorized independent physicians to bargain collectively,47 and
other states will soon be considering similar legislation." Congress
is also considering legislation that would confer antitrust immunity
on physicians in their collective negotiations with health plans,
49
including both managed care plans and indemnity insurers.50
Is
47 See S.B. 1468, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999). See genera//y Leibenluft, supra note 4, at 9-11
(discussing physicians' desire to unionize).
" See AMA, Private Sector Objectives: Increase Physicians'NegotiatingLeverge (visited Sept. 8,
1999) <lttp://www.ama-assn.org/advocacy/psadvocacy/leverage.htm> (on file with author)
(outlining strategies for increasing physicians' leverage against HMOs).
See Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3
(1999) ("Campbell Bill"). The Campbell Bill apparently does not require payors to recog-
nize unions of independent physicians or to refrain from unfair labor practices in their
dealings with unions. See i& The bill would make physicians "who are engaged in negotia-
tions with a health plan ... entitled to the same treatment under the antitrust laws as the
treatment to which bargaining units which are recognized under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act are entitled." Id. § 3(a) (emphasis added). However, it further provides that such
physicians shall "only in connection with such negotiations, be treated as an employee...
and shall not be regarded as having the status of an employer, independent contractor,
managerial employee, or supervisor." Id. This apparently superfluous language raises the
question whether physicians, once engaged in negotiations, enjoy the rights accorded under
the NLRA to employees during the pendency of the negotiations. See id. Given the specific
limitation of immunity to the antitrust laws, the language is probably best interpreted as an
effort to foreclose unduly narrow interpretations of the statute. Given the history of the
labor exemption, see infra note 98, such an effort would not be unwarranted.
', See Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. § 3
(1999). The federal legislation defines a health plan as "a group health plan, a health insur-
ance issuer that is offering health insurance coverage, a Medicare+Choice organization that
is offering a Medicare+Choice plan, or a Medicaid managed care entity ... ." Id. §
3(d) (2) (A). Health insurance issuer and health insurance coverage are also, in turn,
broadly defined. See id. § 3(d)(2)(B), (C). It would appear to permit a physician organiza-
tion such as a union or a county medical society representing virtually 100% of local physi-
cians to negotiate a fee schedule with Blue Cross and other payors. See id. § 3(a). It also
appears to authorize collective negotiation of contractual provisions unrelated to physicians'
fees. See id. Local physicians might thus collectively refuse to accept payment arrangements,
such as capitation or fee withholds, that create incentives for providers to reduce costs.
More dramatically, they might refuse any outside review of medical necessity by health plans
or attempt to dictate other nonprice features of health plans. Cf. Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 356-57 (1982) (finding collective negotiations to be per se
illegal price fixing conspiracy); United States v. Federation of Certified Surgeons & Special-
ists, Inc., 64 Fed. Reg. 5831 (Dep'tJustice 1999) (consent decree filed Jan. 6, 1999) (stating
that defendants collectively sought to obtain higher fees for services than were provided in
individually negotiated contracts); College of Physicians and Surgeons of Puerto Rico, 5
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24, 335 (D.P.R. 1997) (consent decree) (noting that providers
collectively demanded price-related changes to Puerto Rico's managed care plan for indi-
gent).
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B. Independent Contractor Unions and Health Care Markets
In light of current efforts to lift restrictions on independent phy-
sicians' collective bargaining, physician unionization has emerged
as an important policy issue for courts and legislatures. Advocates
of increased unionization argue that physician unions will benefit
consumers by equalizing bargaining power between doctors and
large health plans and by assuring consumers of acceptable health
care quality. The most obvious danger of the unionization move-
ment is that it will increase health care costs by legalizing cartel-like
physician price fixing and other collective anticompetitive activity.
These arguments are considered below.
As noted above, current law permits only employed physicians to
engage in collective bargaining. The preceding discussion suggests
three possible outcomes regarding independent physicians' collec-
tive bargaining rights. First, new legislation might grant independ-
ent physicians the right to bargain collectively with virtually any
private health plan. 5' Second, should the NLRB and the courts
ultimately conclude that HMOs' relationships with their network
physicians are the substantial equivalent of employment relation-
ships, independent physicians in markets with significant HMO
penetration would be able to engage in collective bargaining with
some (though probably not all) plans in those markets.52 Finally,
should the status quo continue, the potential for physician unioni-
zation will grow only to the extent that the trend toward increased
physician employment continues. Price and cost effects of each of
these scenarios are considered in turn below."
1. Market Effects of New Legislation
A study commissioned by the Health Insurance Association of
America ("HIAA Study") estimates that passage of federal legisla-
tion authorizing collective bargaining by independent physicians
would increase health care expenditures by between $34.5 billion
and $80 billion annually.5 The HIAA Study attributes between
See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of nonprice effects, see ifa Part III.
SSee CHARLEs RIVER ASSOCIATES, INC., ANTITRUST WAIVERS FOR PHYSICIANS: CoSS AND
CONSEQUENCES, SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS (June 1999) (commissioned by Health
Insurance Association of America) [hereinafter HIAA STUDY]. As this Article went to press,
the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO) had just released its "scoring" of the Campbell
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$17.8 billion to $27.4 billion of the increase to the projected loss of
discounts that managed care plans have been able to negotiate
with providers." In addition, the study attributes $16.7 billion to
$52.6 billion to changing utilization patterns that could be ex-
pected to emerge if union bargaining resulted in the curtailment
of utilization review and other policies currently used by health
plans to contain costs." Together, these new costs are projected to
translate into private sector premium increases of between six and
eleven percent. 7 Based on the Congressional Budget Office's es-
timate that each one percent increase in health insurance costs
results in an additional two hundred thousand to three hundred
thousand Americans becoming uninsured, passage of this legisla-
tion could swell the ranks of the uninsured by as many as three
million people."
Physician union proponents argue that immunizing collective
bargaining is necessary to prevent competitive distortions caused
Bill. The CBO estimates that passage of the legislation 'would increase expenditures on
private health insurance by 2.6 percent in 2006 in the absence of any compensating changes
on the part of health plans or other entities." CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFicE, CosT
EsrMATE, H.R. 1304, QuALr HEALTH-CARE COALITION AcT OF 1999 2 (Mar. 15, 2000).
The CBO also predicts that "[d]irect [federal] spending for the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
would grow by an estimated $165 million in 2001 and by $11.3 billion over the 2001-2010
period." I, at 1. Finally, the CBO also projects a $145 million loss in federal tax revenue in
2001 as a result of the bill and $10.9 billion in revenue losses between 2001-2010 if the bill is
enacted. See id.
See HIAA STUDY, supra note 54, at 1. The H/AA Study reflects a range of assumptions
about (1) the discounts managed care plans have been able to negotiate from providers and
(2) the proportion of those discounts that would be lost in the event of collective bargaining
by providers. See id. at 3. The HLAA Study's projections include six scenarios. See id. at thl.1.
The projections noted in the text do not reflect the best-case cost increase of $20 billion
($5.1 billion price effect plus $14.8 billion utilization effect) or the worst-case increase of
$124.2 billion ($45.7 billion price effect plus $78.5 billion utilization effect). See id. Unions
would presumably be able to recover lost discounts because they would enjoy market power
in negotiations with payors. S%- oia Part LB.3.
" See HIAA STUDY, supra note 54, at 4-5. Significantly, the Campbell Bill would give
bargaining by independent physicians *the same treatment under the antitrust laws as the
treatment to which bargaining units which are recognized under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act are entitled in connection with such collective bargaining." H.R. 1304, 106th
Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1999). As discussed below, the degree to which physician employees
are entitled to bargain over the features of managed care plans is subject to debate. See infra
Part IlI.
SSee HIAA STuDY, supm note 54, at 3.
Se CONGREssiONAL BuDGET OmI, CBO's EsTImATz OF THE IMPAcT OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH PARrY AMENDMENT IN H.R. 3103 (May 13, 1996); cf. JOHN SHIELS Er AL, EXPLORING
THE DrrERmINANTS OF EMPLOYER HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (1998) (discussing study
prepared by Lewin Group for AFL-CIO finding that each 1.0% real increase in health insur-
ance premiums results in a 0.2% to 0.6% decline in number of covered workers).
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by large health plans' alleged monopoly buying power ("mo-
nopsony").- They also argue that physician unions will protect
consumers against overaggressive cost cutting that jeopardizes plan
quality.6 Union proponents are correct that permitting health
plans to wield monopsony power against health care providers is
not in the best interests of consumers. Health plan monopsonists
would tend to purchase physician services at depressed prices, with
the result that physician output and service would tend to drop
below competitive levels.6
It does not follow, however, that physician unions are the best
available solution to the monopsony problem. Economic theory
does not speak to the net welfare effects that would result when a
powerful union is empowered to negotiate with an incumbent
health plan monopsonist. Permitting physicians to obtain counter-
vailing economic power through labor unions would create a bilat-
eral monopoly, which may or may not improve consumer welfare.62
On the other hand, a market with healthy competition on both
sides of the transaction is clearly preferable to both monopsony
and bilateral monopoly.63 This suggests that more antitrust en-
forcement, not more unionization, is the better response to mo-
nopsony.
In addition, monopsony is not a problem in most markets. Most
unionization proposals, however, do not narrowly target only mar-
kets in which MCOs have market power.6 Instead, they would
permit doctors to bargain collectively even if the other party to the
negotiations is not a monopsonist. A law that gives doctors across-
' See Negotiating Pmtetion for Healthare Prouiders: Hearings on H.R 1304 Befo the House
Comm on the Judiiary, 106th Cong. 1st Sess. (1999) (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson,Jr.,
Executive Vice President, Chief Executive Officer, AMA) [hereinafter Anderson statement].
* See H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. § 2(4) (1999) (proposing legislative finding of fact that:
"Permitting health care professionals to negotiate collectively with health care plans will
create a more equal balance of negotiating power, will promote competition, and will en-
hance the quality of patient care."); see also Anderson statement, supra note 59.
' See generally HERBERT HOvENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 1.2b (1994) (discussing implications of monopsony).
See MARTIN GAYNOR & WILLIAM B. VOGT, ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION IN HEALTH
CARE MARKETS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 7112 § 5.3 (May
1999) <http://www.nber.org> (on file with author). See generally R.D. BLAIR & J.L
HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 109-11 (1993) (explaining bilat-
eral monopolies and effects).
" Se GAYNOR & VOGT, supra note 62.
The statement in the text is true of legislative proposals. The doctors' theory in
AmiHealth HMO, discussed supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text, represents a more
limited theory.
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the-board unionization rights will thus create physician market
power in many markets in which no monopsonist is operating."
Paradoxically, union legislation may actually facilitate the en-
trenchment of health plan monopsonists. In the event physician
unions and health plans follow the lead of their counterparts in
other industries, one might expect to see unions engaging in
"multiplan" bargaining. Large health plans would undoubtedly
attempt to use this process to their competitive advantage. In capi-
tal-intensive industries, large firms may accept marketwide wage
increases knowing that the increase will hurt their smaller, wage-
intensive rivals more than the large firms.m Large health plans
might adopt a similar strategy, acceding to union demands as long
as their competitive advantage over smaller rivals is maintained.67
The claim that physician unions will improve the performance of
health care markets by providing consumers with an appropriate
level of quality is also highly dubious, at least if the past perform-
ance of organized medicine provides any guidance. Physicians
enjoyed a de facto exemption from the antitrust laws until 1975,
when the Supreme Court held that professionals were engaged in a
trade or business and were therefore not exempt from antitrust
laws.m Prior to 1975, the medical profession systematically sup-
pressed an impressive array of potential innovations on the ground
that they jeopardized health care quality or the "physician-patient
, See United States v. Aetna, No. 3-99CV 1398-H, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19691 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 7, 1999); see also United States v. Aetna Inc., 64 Fed. Reg. 44946 (Aug. 18, 1999)
(competitive impact statement); Leibenluft, supra note 4, at 4-7.
SSee HOvENKAmp, supra note 61, at § 7.10. See geneal Thomas G. Krattenmaker &
Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exdusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96
YAlE lJ. 209 (1986) (examining whether exclusionary practices that increase competitors'
costs enable excluding firm to exercise monopoly power); Oliver Williamson, Wage Rates as a
Battier to Entry: the Pennington Case in Perspective, QJ. ECON., Feb. 1968, at 85 (stating that
onegroup of firms can manipulate wage rates to disadvantage of another group of firms).
The Campbell Bill may not immunize multiplan bargaining. See H.R. 1304, 106th
Cong. 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1999) (providing for immunity "only in connection with ...
negotiations); Campbell Statement, supra note 15, at 30 (testifying that bill "is only dealing
with the statutory exemption").
" See Goldfarb v. Vhrginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (holding that county
bar association fee schedule constituted illegal price fixing conspiracy); s also American
Med. Ass'n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 449-50 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing professional norms that
facilitated anticompetitive practices among health care providers), affid by an equaly divided
cot&, 455 U.S. 676 (1982), r'hk denied, 456 U.S. 966 (1982); Clark Havighurst, P-fessional
Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DuKE UJ. 303, 343 (1978) (observing
significance of Goldfab's holding that learned professionals are not exempt from antitrust
laws).
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relationship."" Organized medicine tried (successfully in many
cases) to prevent the formation of HMOs," to discourage hospital-
based medical practice,7' and to limit the professional opportuni-
ties of osteopaths, psychologists, chiropractors, nurse practitioners,
and other personnel." It simultaneously limited the supply of phy-
sicians through the accreditation process" and resisted even mildly
intrusive efforts at cost containment.74 Fearing limitations on pro-
fessional autonomy, the profession at various times actively op-
posed both private and public health insurance programs.7 5 Al-
though the medical community accomplished some of these goals
through government-conferred political authority, economic coer-
cion was at least as important a weapon. Physicians that associated
with disfavored practitioners or engaged in prohibited business
arrangements were threatened with expulsion from the local
medical society, loss of hospital admitting privileges, referral black-
listing, or expulsion from physician-controlled health insurance
0 See Havighurst, supra note 68, at 306-19 (discussing opposition of medical profession
to cost-containment).
See United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952) (holding that
government did not prove Sherman Act violation charges); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp.,
413 F.2d 826, 829 (4th Cir. 1969) (holding hospital's regulations barring physicians from
having their offices and practice outside of county was unconstitutional under Fourteenth
Amendment); American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1942)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence against physicians of conspiracy to restrain
trade), aff'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Group Health Coop. v. King Co. Med. Soc'y, 237 P.2d 737,
766 (Wash. 1951) (preventing physicians from combining as restraint on trade).
7 See Comment, The American Medical Association. Powe, Purpose, and Politics in Organized
Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 937,979-80 (1954) [hereinafter Power, Pupose, and Politics] (describing
AMA's efforts to suppress hospital practice by radiologists, pathologists and anesthesiolo-
gists). "Medical societies have characterized hospital practice as primarily a moral problem;
they fear exploitation and lowering the dignity of the profession, and envision lay-employer
control as forcing a lower standard of care for the patient." Id. at 979.
7 See id. at 963-69; CLARK C. HAvIGHURSr ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND Poucy832-38
(2d ed. 1998) (providing overview of conflicts between medical profession and unorthodox
practitioners).
7 See generally PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 112-
27 (1982) (tracing historical development of accreditation process); Reuben A. Kessel, The
A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267 (1970) (describing
AMA's role in deciding output of physicians); Power, Purpose and Politics, supra note 71, at
969-74 (commenting on AMA's accrediting of medical schools).
" See, e.g., Lawrence G. Goldberg & Warren Greenberg, The Effect of Physician Controlled
Healh Insurance: U.S. v. Oregon State Medical Society, 2J. HEALTH POL POL'Y& L 48,72-73
(1977) (noting doctors' opposition to price controls).
See STARR, supra note 73, at 235-89 (commenting on physicians' resistance to health
insurance); Power, Purpose and Politic supra note 71, at 981-82, 997-1000 (noting that AMA
has not always been supportive of health insurance).
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plans."6 Doctors boycotted insurance plans that did not submit to
professional rules and threatened to take their patients elsewhere
when hospitals did not accede to their demands.
One might well respond that physician unions' attempts to serve
consumer interests, even if badly flawed, would nevertheless result
in more extensive consumer protections than an imperfectly func-
tioning market would generate. The obstacles to a well-
functioning market in health care services are well known. Rela-
tively few consumers today enjoy a wide range of choices among
health plans, and information regarding health plans and provid-
ers is not always sufficient to ensure that consumers are able to
make an adequate comparison among the available choices. Nev-
ertheless, these problems are anything but unnoticed at present;
managed care reform has become a cottage industry at both the
federal and state levels.7s Given the intense scrutiny health plans
are now facing from democratically accountable institutions, con-
sumers have little to gain from giving physicians the power to dic-
tate the policies of managed care plans through collective bargain-
See, e.g., Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605,608 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting
denial of staff privileges and malpractice insurance), cert. denied sub non., Nurse Midwifery
Assocs. v. Hendersonville Community Hosp., 502 U.S. 952 (1991); Virginia Academy of
Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield, 624 F.2d 476, 478 (4th Cir. 1980) (refusing to permit
insurance coverage of competitors' services); Sams v. Ohio Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d
826, 827 (4th Cir. 1969) (discussing denial of staff privileges); AMA v. United States, 130
F.2d 233, 239 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (stating that AMA imposed disciplinary action against
individual with intent to affect individual's practice association), affid, 317 U.S. 519 (1943);
id at 250 n.87 (describing Mundt Resolution, which withheld AMA accreditation from in-
ternship programs where all staff physicians were not members of local medical societies);
Health Corp. of Am. v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n, 424 F. Supp. 931, 932 (D. NJ. 1977) (dis-
cussing harassment of innovative plans); Hubbard v. Medical Serv. Corp., 367 P.2d 1003,
1005 (Wash. 1962) (discussing situation where referrals withheld). See generaly Havighurst,
supra note 68, at 307-15 (noting ethical rules that denied professional opportunities to doc-
tors who participated in professional groups); Pozw, Purpose and Politics, supra note 71, at
988-96 (describing AMA's method of punishing physicians associated with disapproved
schemes).
" See Havighurst, supra note 68, at 312.
Legislatures are proving to be quite willing to respond to demands for consumer
protection. See Russell Korobkin, The EffOiency of Managed Care Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNiL L REV. 1, 1 (1999);
see also Hearings on the Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1998, H.R 4277, Before the House
Comm. on theJudiciary, 105th Cong. 18 2d Sess. (1998) (statement- of Robert Pitofsky, Chair-
man, FTC) ("'[Qjuality of care arguments ... easily can be invoked as a justification for
even the most egregious anticompetitive conduct. They have been advanced to support,
among other things, broad restraints on almost any form of price competition, policies that
inhibited the development of managed care organizations, and concerted refusals to deal
with providers or organizations that represented a competitive threat to physicians.") (foot-
note omitted).
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ing. On the contrary, organized medicine's track record of resist-
ing virtually every intrusion on professional control suggests that
consumers may have a lot to lose from widespread unionization.
2. Market Effects of Changes in Decisional Law
Even if Congress and the state legislatures decide not to change
the laws governing physician union activity, the NLRB and the
courts may yet conclude that some physicians that contract with
MCOs are de facto employees and thus should be entitled to bar-
gain collectively under the NLRA. The NLRB's actions in Ameri-
Health suggest that it is open to such an argument." It seems likely,
however, that de facto employee status will occur only in markets
where managed care penetration is high enough such that network
affiliation is a precondition to an economically viable medical prac-
tice.
If the NLRB and the courts begin holding that independent phy-
sicians can sometimes enjoy de facto employee status, one would
expect the effects on health care prices and plan structure to be
similar to those discussed above in connection with union enabling
legislation.8s However, as just noted, these effects would likely be
confined to markets with significant penetration by highly inte-
grated managed care plans. Some observers believe that consumer
preference for plans permitting greater provider choice will limit
the ultimate success of tightly integrated plans in most markets.8' If
they are correct, physician unions representing de facto employees
of local payors would be of only limited importance.
On the other hand, predictions of the demise of highly inte-
grated health plans may prove incorrect. Recent health care cost
increases combined with the end of the current economic expan-
sion may rejuvenate consumer interest in lower-cost plans, even
those that restrict consumers' choice of provider. Even without a
change in consumer preference, unions' effects in markets with
high managed care penetration should not be underestimated.
Even limited collective bargaining with MCOs would tend to di-
minish the cost differential between MCOs and fee-for-service
SSee supra text accompanying notes 34-46.
Swe g., supr Part I.B.1.
' Sm Robert A. Berenson, Beyond Competition, HEALTH AFF., March/April 1997, at 171.
[Vol. 33:545
2000] Physician Unions and the Future of Competition 565
plans, presumably reducing the pressure on fee-for-service plans to
keep costs down.
3. The Legal Status Quo and Prospects for the Future
Even if Congress and the courts do not give independent physi-
cians collective bargaining rights, physician unions may still have a
noticeable effect on health care markets. Members of employee
unions may sometimes enjoy a measure of market power in one or
more markets for physician services. Where this is the case, the
union may succeed in raising its members' wages over a sustained
period of time, likely increasing health care costs within that mar-
ket.
To understand the circumstances in which a union might
achieve market power, consider two hypothetical cases. In the first,
all physicians sell their services in a fully competitive market at a
price approximating the cost of providing the services. In such a
case, any doctor that attempted to raise prices would lose all his or
her business because consumers would immediately look elsewhere
for services available at the lower market price. Nor would any
physician have an incentive to sell services at a reduced rate, be-
cause the physician would not be able to sell any additional services
by doing so.
Suppose next that instead of competing with each other, all phy-
sicians in our hypothetical market join a labor union and decide
collectively to raise fees ten percent above the competitive price.
Unlike the decision by a single doctor in a competitive market, the
union's decision may prove both sustainable and profitable for the
union members. Seriously ill patients are unlikely to find good
substitutes for physician services, forcing them to pay the higher
price rather than travel a long distance or forgo needed medical
care. Moreover, licensure laws and other barriers to entry may
limit the extent to which the union's high price invites entry into
the market by nonunion physicians on a significant scale for some
time to come.
No real world market, especially not a medical services market,
meets the theoretical requirements of either perfect competition
" See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 10.10, 11.1 (5th ed. 1998)
(explaining that amount of cost increase passed along to consumers will depend on elasticity
of demand for product).
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(the first hypothetical) or monopoly (the second).83 Nevertheless,
the polar cases shed light on the unions' capacity to raise the price
of physician services in a given community. The less market power
a labor union enjoys, the less successful it is likely to be in raising
its members' wages above competitive levels. All things being
equal, union price increases will lead purchasers to seek cheaper
alternatives." Moreover, as the two hypotheticals suggest, market
power is not a function of market share, but ultimately depends on
elasticities of demand and supply for the relevant product - the
ability of purchasers in the market to substitute other goods or ser-
vices for those of the seller in the event of a price increase above
competitive levels and the ability of new sellers to enter the rele-
vant market.
Because it is impractical to measure either the relationship of a
firm's prices to its costs or relevant elasticities of demand or supply,
courts generally use a firm's share of a relevant product and geo-
graphic market as a benchmark for market power.8s Most courts
presume that firms with less than fifty percent of the market can-
not unilaterally raise prices above competitive levels.U In such
cases one would expect to find good substitutes for the dominant
firm's goods or services already available in the market, as well as
firms that could be expected to expand output in response to a
price increase by the dominant firm. In the context of purchasing
health care services, however, physicians thatjointly hold a market
share of less than fifty percent may, in fact, represent a threat to
competition. The federal agencies charged with enforcing the an-
titrust laws assume that a market share as low as twenty percent or
' Physician services are neither entirely fungible nor entirely differentiated. Neither
sellers nor buyers have perfect information. Barriers to entry are usually present but never
perfect and sellers are rarely either completely atomized or utterly without competition.
" The labor laws limit this effect to some degree by forbidding employers to pay re-
placement workers a higher wage than their striking counterparts, by permitting strikers to
picket, and by preventing the employer from completely severing the employment relation-
ship with striking workers. See POSNER, supra note 82, at § 11.2.
See eg., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 571 (1966); Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-13
(1953); see also HA PHILLP AREEDA Er AL, ANTrrRUSr LAW 531 (1995) (discussing court's
definition of market power); HOVENKAMP, supra note 61, § 3.lb.
SSee, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411
(7th Cir. 1995) ("Fifty percent is below any accepted benchmark for inferring monopoly
power from market share."); see also HA AREEDA Er AL, supra note 85,1532.
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thirty percent may threaten competition. s7 Where physicians col-
lectively control such a significant portion of the market, they may
make it difficult for payors to enter a market by foreclosing access
to the physician base needed to form an adequate provider net-
workU
If the relevant market is defined to include all physicians in a
given community, physician unions will rarely attain a market share
in the range of twenty percent and thus might be presumed inca-
pable of harming competition. However, because not all physi-
cians in any community actually compete with each other, it is usu-
ally wrong to include them all in the relevant market. In some ar-
eas, a union of employed physicians might thus achieve market
power with respect to specific physician services (e.g., family physi-
cians),90 resulting in supercompetitive wages for the affected practi-
tioners. In addition, independent and employed physicians may
not be good substitutes for each other, because managed care
plans may prefer to enter into a single contract with an integrated
medical group rather than organize their own network or contract
with a loosely integrated independent practice association. 9' On
the whole, however, physician unions are probably unlikely to af-
fect competition significantly as long as existing rules remain in
place92
SSee generally Statements of Antitrust Enforement Policy in Health Care, [1996] Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 71, at S-16 (Aug. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Antitrust Statements]
(describing antitrust safety zones for physician network joint ventures).
' See iU. (noting that "relevant geographic markets for the delivery of physician services
are local*); see also 2JoHNJ. Mu s, HEALTH CARE & AN=rTSr LAw §§ 15.8-15.13 (1992 &
Supp. 1999).
" Nationwide, only about 42% of the nation's doctors are even eligible to join labor
unions. See Kletke, supra note 9, at 557. Of this group, many practice in small-group settings
in which unionization is unlikely. See id. Moreover, only 40,000 of the nation's roughly
620,000 practicing physicians nationwide belong to unions. See Greenhouse, supm note 8, at
Al, A22. While the number of employee physicians would be expected to be higher in
communities with government hospitals, teaching hospitals or high managed care market
penetration, the likelihood that a union will organize as many as one of every five physicians
in any single community in the foreseeable future is low.
9' I am assuming that the most important source of union activity is doctors that are
employees of MCOs. Hospitals commonly employ specialists such as radiologists, patholo-
gists, anesthesiologists, and emergency physicians, and teaching hospital employees include
the full gamut of specialists. See infia text accompanying notes 111-15 (discussing physician
markets).
But see infta text accompanying notes 116-18.
For a more extensive analysis of markets for physician services, see infra notes 111-15
and accompanying text (noting that physicians often compete across specialty lines).
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II. JOINT UNIONS?
A. The Permissible Legal Scope ofJoint Union Activity
As noted, the labor exemption to the antitrust laws does not
permit groups of independent contractors to bargain collectively."5
However, the exemption arguably permits unions composed of
both employees and independent contractors ("joint unions") to
fix the price of the independent contractors' services without anti-
trust liability. There are at least two primary strategies through
which this might be accomplished. First, the union might adopt
internal bylaws that require independent contractor members to
adhere to a union fee schedule in their individual bargaining with
payors. Second, the union might extract an agreement with one or
more employers to pay independent contractors (union members
or otherwise) at some minimum specified rate. Invoking the Su-
preme Court's famous dictum in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,9 some
courts have held that unions' interest in maintaining the wages of
their employee members would justify either of the two strategies
suggested above.9s
1. Internal Regulation of Members' Prices
In order to evaluate both the legal status of joint physician un-
ions and also such unions' potential effects on competition, con-
sider hypotheticals based on the two strategies mentioned above.
Suppose, first, that twenty percent of local physicians are employ-
ees, and two-thirds of those physicians are represented by a single
union that has collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") with
various employers, including hospitals, multi-specialty clinics and
" See Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942); see also Los
Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 126 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 101
(1962); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 463-64 (1949);
American Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 525 (1943); Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int'l
Union ofJourneyman Horse-Shoers, 353 F.2d 593, 605 (4th Cir. 1965).
310 U.S. 469,503 (1940) ("An elimination of price competition based on differences
in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization.").
" See HA Artists & Assoc., Inc. v. Actor's Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704 (1981); American
Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Teamsters' Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283
(1959); Home Box Office v. Directors' Guild of America, 531 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
aff'd per curiam, 708 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Charles Craver, The Application of Labor
and Anitrust Laws to Physician Unions: The Need for a Re-evaluation of Traditional Concepts in a
Radicalt ChangingFWld, 27 HASTINGS LJ. 55, 90-92 (1975); Hirshfeld, supra note 23, at 59-60
(noting possibility ofjoint physician unions).
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HMOs. If the union recruits independent contractor members as
well as employee members, could it require its independent con-
tractors to adhere to a minimum union fee schedule without in-
curring antitrust liability?9
The first question our hypothetical joint union would face is
whether its adoption of bylaws fixing the independent physicians'
minimum prices would be immune from antitrust scrutiny under
the labor exemption. Similar agreements among independent
physicians outside the union context constitute illegal price fixing,
and have been a major focal point of government enforcement
activity.9 Notwithstanding the government's concerns that such
arrangements have the potential to harm consumers, a plausible
case can be made for their immunity.
The history of the labor exemption is a complex story of back-
and-forth decision making between Congress and the judiciary."
The end result has been the creation of two separate, albeit closely
related," legal rules: the "statutory" and "nonstatutory" exemp-
tions. The statutory exemption rests on the Sherman, Clayton, and
Norris-LaGuardia Acts,1°° and shields agreements among employees
Cf Home Box Off4ce, 531 F. Supp. at 582-85 (upholding union bylaws that prevented
independent contractor producer-director members from working for firms that had not
executed collective bargaining agreement with union). Home Box Office also involved the
execution of a CBA on behalf of "freelance" directors, whom the court held to be employ-
ees. See id at 582; see a/so CanrA 391 U.S. at 104 (upholding bylaws and union rules govern-
ing "club-date" performances and collective bargaining agreements governed non-club-date
("steady") engagements).
27 See United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Health Care Task Force,
Recent Enforcement Actions (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
health care/2044.htm> (on file with author); Richard A. Feinstein, FC Antitrust Actions in
Heath Care Servim and Pmducers (Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/bc/atahcsvs.htm> (on
file with author).
" See generaly United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 700-03 (1965) (opin-
ion of Goldberg, J.) (commenting on congressional responses to Court's interpretation of
Sherman Act); United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,230-31 (1941) (noting controversy
in Congress over Clayton Act and Court's case-by-case interpretation of Sherman Act); Ber-
nard D. Meltzer, Labor Unions, Colctive Bargaining and the Antitrust Lams 6J.L & ECON. 152,
154-58 (1963) (outlining history of union activity and antitrust litigation); Ralph K Winter,
Colaive Bargaining and Compeition: The Application of Antitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73
YALE LJ. 14,30-38 (1963) (describing history of Sherman Act in regulating union activities).
For a detailed and influential analysis of the labor exemption, see Douglas L Leslie, Princi-
Ples of aborAntitrust, 66 VA. L REv. 1183,1183 (1980).
" See IA PHiLLP AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAmP, ANTrrRusr LAw, 255c (1997) (ar-
guing that factual distinction between statutory and nonstatutory exemptions is "more one
of historical convenience than substance" and that there is "single taproot" underlying both
exemptions: "whether the challenged activities are seen as 'legitimate' labor activities di-
rected at the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees").
'* Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides:
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and labor organizations from antitrust scrutiny."' The nonstatu-
tory exemption, on the other hand, is a judge-made immunity cov-
ering agreements between unions and nonlabor parties'02 The
nonstatutory exemption rests on the recognition that antitrust im-
munity for agreements made within and between labor organiza-
tions would be of little use if the end result of successful union ac-
tivity - a CBA with one or more employers - is an unprotected
antitrust conspiracy."3
Because the hypothetical fee schedule involves an intra-union
agreement, analysis begins with the statutory exemption'0 In or-
der to obtain immunity the union must show (1) that the agree-
ment does not involve a "nonlabor party,""5 (2) that the agreement
was entered into in the union's self-interest"" and, (3) that the
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and op-
eration of labor ... organizations.... or to forbid or restrain individual members
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994). Section 20 of the Act forbids courts from enjoining strikes, boycotts,
or picketing "in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and
employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking em-
ployment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of em-
ployment...." I& § 52. Later, in the wake of a Supreme Court decision holding that the
Clayton Act applies only to "lawful" labor union activities, Dup/ex PrintingPrss v. Deyin& 254
U.S. 443, 473 (1921), Congress passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115
(1994), which further expanded the protection against labor injunctions, specifically forbid-
ding the courts from enjoining secondary boycotts and clarifying Congress's intent to grant
broad immunity to union activities.
... Although the statute is aimed at preventing judicial use of the injunction as a remedy
in connection with labor activities, it has been interpreted to immunize covered conduct
from liability under the antitrust laws as well. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219,
236 (1941) ("The Norris-LaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act
by infusing into it the immunized trade union activities as redefined by the later Act. In this
light § 20 removes all such allowable conduct from the taint of being 'violations of any law of
the United States,' including the Sherman Law.").
'* See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621-22
(1975).
See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMp, supra note 99, 256a.
One might argue that because the fee schedule will affect the members' agreements
with third-party payors, it should be analyzed under the nonstatutory exemption. However,
as we shall see, the tests under the two exemptions are substantially similar, so applying the
nonstatutory exemption test should not change the result. See infta notes 144-47 and ac-
companying text.
'm See HA Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717 (1981);
American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1968); Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at
232.
'*' See H.A. Atlists, 451 U.S. at 715; Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232.
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challenged agreement is related to the union's legitimate inter-
ests. '0
a. Agreement with Nonlabor Parties
The statutory exemption is embodied in section 20 of the Clay-
ton Act and section 13 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 13
specifically defines "labor disputes" to include
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment,
or concerning the association or representation of persons in ne-
gotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee. 10
8
In order to show that independent physicians are "labor parties,"
the union must prove that its employee members are either in "job
or wage competition"'O' with the independent physicians or that
there is some "other [common] economic ... [interest] affecting
legitimate union interests between the union members and the
independent contractors.0
'07 See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 718; CarroL 391 U.S. at 106; Local 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691-92 (1965); United Mine Workers v. Pen-
nington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965); set also IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 99,
255c, 255e. There is considerable debate over the precise contours of the appropriate legal
test for evaluating immunity under the labor exemption. Supreme Court precedent in this
area has created an impression that cases are decided on an almost ad hoc basis. See Camp-
bell, supra note 15, at 998 n.30 (describing important labor antitrust cases). Scholarly
treatment of the exemption has likewise failed to bring about any consensus test. See IA
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, 255-57; i& at 998-1004; Leslie, supra note 15, at
1184-85.
" 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1994); see aLso H.A. Artists 451 U.S. at 714 n.14, 715; Los Angeles
Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 103 (1962).
'0 See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 718; cf. Los Angeles Meat, 371 U.S. at 103 (holding that
independent contractors were ineligible for labor exemption because they did not compete
with employee union members); United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council Union, Inc.,
183 F. Supp. 227,235 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same).
"* See H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 718; Carr, 391 U.S. at 106; Los Angeles Meat, 371 U.S. at
103; see also Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., 311 U.S.
91, 97-99 (1940) (holding that union attempting to organize competing independent ven-
dors engaged in labor dispute as defined by Norris-LaGaurdia Act). The Court has stated
that *a party seeking refuge in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organiza-
tion, and not an independent contractor or entrepreneur." However, this purported rule
has been honored mostly in the breach. H.A. Artists, 451 U.S. at 717 n.20. In both Carrall
and H.A. Artists, the Court's two most recent efforts to interpret the statutory exemption, the
Court specifically held that independent contractors could be "labor parties." See i& at 720-
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It should usually be possible to prove that there is significant job
and wage competition between employed physician union mem-
bers and the independent physicians they may seek to bring into
the union. Physicians practicing in the same local community are
generally regarded as geographic competitors,"' and at least some
portion of local physicians will compete with each other in any
given product market. The most obvious division in the product
market for physician services is between primary care providers and
specialists. Many different types of physicians are potential com-
petitors in the primary care market. Family physicians compete for
the primary care loyalties of all patients; internists (even those who
also practice a particular subspecialty such as cardiology or pul-
monology) provide primary care to adults; pediatricians provide
primary care to children, and; obstetrician-gynecologists may pro-
vide primary care to women. Each of these groups of physicians
competes with one or more of the other groups in that a significant
portion of each group's practice is likely to represent services that
could be offered by the others."2
Analyzing specialty services is more complicated. Some specialty
services are provided only by specialists of a particular category.
Only cardiothoracic surgeons, for example, are likely to offer heart
bypass surgery. Other services, such as some types of cosmetic sur-
gery, may be performed by general surgeons, plastic surgeons,
dermatologists, and otolaryngologists. Moreover, some services are
available from both specialists and primary care physicians."3 Spe-
cialists are also more likely to compete with physicians outside the
local community, as patients needing specialized nonurgent treat-
ment are more likely to travel reasonable distances to obtain it
21 (theatrical agents); CarroI 391 U.S. at 106 (orchestra leaders); id. at 113 (booking
agents).
.. See Anfitnust Statenns supra note 87, at S-16 n.26 (noting that "relevant geographic
markets for the delivery of physician services are local"). See gsnera1Iy MiLES, supra note 88, at
§ 15.13.
"' See, e-g., HTI Health Servs. v. Quorum Health Group, 960 F. Supp. 1104, 1115-16
(S.D. Miss. 1997) (finding that market for primary care physician services includes general
practitioners, family practitioners, internists and pediatricians as distinct submarket but does
not include obstetrician-gynecologists); Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, to Robert M. Langer (July 30, 1997) (on file with Department ofJustice, Business
Review Letter to Vermont Physicians Clinic).
"' See, e.g., Letter from Anne IL Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, to Oswald L
Mikel, M.D. (Nov. 1, 1995) (on file with Department of Justice, Business Review Letter)
(noting that it is appropriate to include internists, general practitioners, family practice
physicians, and dermatologists in dermatology product market).
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than patients seeking primary care."4  In any given market, it is
likely that some significant portion of independeint primary care
specialists will be in "job competition" with the employee members
of our hypothetical union."5
The strongest argument that employed physicians do not com-
pete with their independent counterparts is that MCOs would not
regard organizing a network of independent physicians as a good
substitute for owning or contracting with an integrated multispe-
cialty clinic staffed by employed physicians. 6 If this were the case,
competition from independent physicians would not necessarily
limit the ability of an employed physicians union to extract wage
increases and other concessions from an MCO.
This argument, however, is ultimately implausible. Many MCOs
provide care through networks of independent physicians rather
than through clinics staffed by employees. Indeed, the current
trend is for MCOs to offer consumers greater choice among pro-
viders, suggesting that most MCOs prefer looser networks to more
tightly integrated structures.17 Thus, an MCO would likely substi-
tute the services of independent physicians for those of its employ-
ees if its wage costs rose too dramatically."8
"' See M=LES, supra note 88, at § 15.13; Letter from MarkJ. Horoschak, Assistant Direc-
tor, Bureau of Competition, to Neil E. Ayervais (Sept. 23, 1994) (Federal Trade Commission
Advisory Opinion) (on file with author).
" This same rationale would justify a finding, in the alternative, that employees and
independent physicians have common economic interests affecting legitimate union inter-
ests. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Because the purchasers of physician ser-
vices (most notably MCOs, but also other payors) can substitute the services of union mem-
bers for those of independent physicians and vice-versa, the presence of independent con-
tractors in physician services markets will directly affect the union's ability to succeed in
bettering the wages and working conditions of its members.
" This argument was made and rejected in HT Heafth Service v. Quorum Heath GrouL
See -/7" Healag 960 F. Supp. at 1117-20; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic,
65 F.3d 1406, 1409-11 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that HMO services do not constitute separate
product market), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F.
Supp. 1285, 1300 & n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (rejecting focus on hospital services purchased by
managed care organizations).
"' Se Berenson, supra note 81, at 171 (arguing that health care markets have not
evolved as managed competition theorists predicted, in part because of consumers' desire to
maintain access to personal physicians).
"s Only if one first regards managed care plans as occupying a separate product market
from more conventional forms of health insurance (presumably a product appealing to
buyers who place an unusual premium on low cost) and, second, finds that physician-
employees are the only means of providing low-cost, efficient service to consumers, might
one then conclude that employed physicians should be treated separately from their inde-
pendent counterparts. It is worth noting that every court to address the issue in the context
of an antitrust dispute has refused to find that managed care plans do not compete with
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b. Self-Interest
As noted above, to gain immunity under the statutory exemption
a union must also prove that it is acting in its own interest and is
pursuing legitimate union objectives. These additional require-
ments present some significant obstacles for our hypothetical fee
schedule bylaws. As long as independent physicians continue to
outnumber employed physicians, unions that attempt to organize
independent physicians will almost certainly be accused of acting
not in their self-interest, but rather in the interest of the independ-
ent doctors. Indeed, if joint physician unions were to succeed, in-
dependent physicians might join the union solely for the purpose
of availing themselves of the union's antitrust exemption. Where
the union allows itself to be used for such purposes, the antitrust
exemption should not be available.
In order to succeed in organizing independent doctors, physi-
cian unions will have to demonstrate how the organizing activity
benefits the employed physicians who form the core of the un-
ion." In particular, the union should be able to show the connec-
tion between union policies and the economic interests of its em-
ployee members. For example, a union's independent contractor
more conventional forms of health insurance. See Doctors Hosp. v. Southeast Med. Alliance,
Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 308 n.15 (5th Cir. 1997); Marshfidd Cli 65 F.3d at 1409-11; US.
Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 599 (1st Cir. 1993); Ball Mem'l Hasp.,
Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1986), reh'k deni&4 788 F.2d
1223 (7th Cir. 1986); The Orthopedic Studio, Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan, No. CV-95-4338, 1996
WL 84503, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996); Total Benefits Servw., Inc. v. Group Ins. Admin.,
Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1228, 1237-38 (E.D. La. 1995); Hassan v. Independent Practice Assocs.,
P.C., 698 F. Supp. 679, 691 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 663 F.
Supp. 1360, 1478-79 (D. Kan. 1987), affid in part 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), curL denied,
497 U.S. 1005 (1990); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 574 F. Supp. 457,
469-71 (M.D. Pa. 1983), affd, 745 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1984), cwt denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985);
see also Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 547
(2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 947 (1993). To the extent an MCO enjoyed a cost ad-
vantage over its competitors, it would have some degree of flexibility in its pricing. Deter-
mining that the MCO and its competitors compete in the same market represents ajudicial
policy judgment about 'how much market power we want to squeeze out of markets, given
our capabilities and the costs of antitrust enforcement." HOVNKAMP, supra note 61, at 85.
" Employees form the core of a joint union in the sense that the labor laws are in-
tended to protect employees and, only incidentally, independent contractors. See Interna-
tional Ass'n of Heat & Asbestos Workers v. United Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 483 F.2d 384, 390
(3d Cir. 1973) (discussing sham union controlled by employer-independent contractors);
Carpenters' Dist. Council v. United Contractors Ass'n, 484 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1973)
(same).
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fee schedule specifying minimum prices for services not regularly
offered by employee members would be highly suspect.'"
c. Legitimate Union Interests
The third element of the statutory exemption requires our hypo-
thetical physicians' union to demonstrate that its fee schedule fur-
thers legitimate union interests."' The need forjudicial scrutiny of
the legitimacy of union interests arises from an inherent conflict
between labor and antitrust policy. Although the object of anti-
trust policy is to ensure competitive markets, a union's effective-
ness requires the elimination of competition from nonunion work-
ers.122 Inevitably, suppression of competition in the labor market
affects the employer's product market as well, eliminating at least
"that part of such competition which is based on differences in
labor standards." '23 If antitrust law were to condemn all anticom-
petitive effects in the product market, it would virtually eviscerate
federal labor policy."4  On the other hand, blanket antitrust im-
munity for any union-imposed restraint could have dramatic effects
on industry competition. The courts thus attempt to steer a mid-
dle ground, "tolera[ting] ... the lessening of business competition
based on differences in wages and working conditions," but refus-
ing to permit unions to "impose direct restraints on competition
among those who employ its members."' " The labor exemption
will thus almost always apply to agreements related to wages, hours
and working conditions - issues that are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining.1' It would not apply, however, to a union
'2 Cf local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-94 (1959) (holding
that narrow scope of collective bargaining agreement provisions fixing equipment lease
prices for independent contractor driver show[s] that its [lawful] objective is to protect the
negotiated wage scale against the possible undermining through diminution of the owner's
wages for driving which might result from a rental which did not cover his operating costs").
'e IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supm note 99, 255el; see also USS-POSCO Indust. v.
Contra Costa County Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800,808 (9th Cir. 1994); supra
note 107 and accompanying text.
," See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 503 (1940) ('[I]n order to render a
labor combination effective it must eliminate the competition from nonunion made
goods .... ").
'" I& ('[A]n elimination of price competition based on differences in labor standards is
the objective of any national labor organization.").
' See Conneil Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616,622 (1975).
I& at 622.
See 29U.S.C.§ 158(d) (1994).
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strike demanding, for example, that an employer charge a high
price in the product market in order to create more available cash
for wage increases.'2 In general, courts are far less concerned
about union-generated restraints in the labor market than about
restraints in the employer's product market. Restraints in the
product market are tolerated only when there is no less restrictive
alternative to achieving the union's legitimate objective.
The first step in determining whether our hypothetical fee
schedule bylaws further legitimate union interests is thus to iden-
tify the union's purported interest in promulgating the fee sched-
ule. The union's obvious motive - keeping its employee mem-
bers' wages high - is at the core of American labor policy.12s Nev-
ertheless, because courts do not give even core labor interests
unlimited deference, the connection between the union's interest
in high wages and the fee schedule must be identified and scruti-
nized'29
The connection between the fee schedule and high wages for
employed union members is clear. The union cannot sustain its
demand for high wages over the long term unless it can suppress
competition in the market for its members' services. As long as
employee union members must compete with independent physi-
cians, increases in the employees' wages will only make the services
See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, 255c.
' Indeed, wages are among the mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. See 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1994); see aLso American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 108-09
(1968) (characterizing union price list that specified amounts that orchestra leader-union
members would pay themselves and the "side musician"-union members they hired as "sim-
ply a means for coping with the job and wage competition of the leaders to protect the wage
scales of musicians who ... are employees" and characterizing the price list as 'indistin-
guishable in its effect from all collective bargaining provisions in Teamsters Union v.
Oliver") (internal citations omitted); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S.
283, 294 (1959) ("The inadequacy of a rental which means that the owner makes up his
excess costs from his driver's wages not only dearly bears a dose relation to labor's efforts to
improve working conditions but is in fact of vital concern to the carrier's employed drivers;
an inadequate rental might mean the progressive curtailment ofjobs through withdrawal of
more and more carrier-owned vehicles from service."); id at 294-95 (holding that equipment
lease price schedule was mandatory subject of collective bargaining); Craver, supm note 95,
at 91 (arguing that regulation of independent doctors' fees would be in legitimate interest
of union of employed physicians). But see CarnomI 391 U.S. at 110 n.10 (suggesting potential
for different result if prices set had been maximum prices or had been "set so high as to
cover not merely compensation for the additional services rendered by a leader but entre-
preneurial profit as well.").
'" Se Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690 n.5 (1965) (stating that
"crucial determinant is not the form of the agreement - e.g., prices or wages - but its
relative impact on the product market and the interests of union members"); IA AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, 1 255c3.
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of independent doctors more attractive to payors and other pur-
chasers. As a result, the presence of competing nonunionized,
independent physicians will tend to limit the union's ability to raise
its members' wages and improve their working conditions. The fee
schedule limits price competition from independent physicians
and thereby reduces the incentives of health care purchasers to
respond to union wage demands by substituting away from union
physicians.'30
Having identified the union's means of accomplishing its objec-
tive - the fee schedule - the next step is to identify the anticom-
petitive effects the fee schedule will cause in the relevant labor and
product markets as well as any plausible less restrictive alternatives.
Distinguishing between labor market effects and product market
effects1 3 ' can be especially difficult in health care markets because
the physician labor market and the market for medical services
were historically one and the same. For most of the twentieth cen-
tury, doctors practiced independently, selling their services directly
to their patients on a fee-for-service basis.32 Early forms of health
insurance, most notably Blue Shield, were designed to preserve this
arrangement. Physicians were essentially free to set their own
prices, and the insurer acted as a passive payor, indemnifying the
patient for expenses incurred. "
' Seesupra text accompanying notes 111-15.
.. See supra text accompanying notes 118-24.
' Significantly, this mode of practice was largely the result of policies instituted by
organized medicine. The ethical code of the medical profession forbade "contract practice"
- in which a physician sells services to a corporate "middleman" - until the Federal Trade
Commission successfully attacked the code as a restraint of trade. See AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d
443, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1980), aFd by an equally divided court 455 U.S. 676 (1982), reh k denied,
456 U.S. 966 (1982) (upholding FTC order prohibiting American Medical Association from
imposing restraints on certain advertising, solicitation and contractual practices of physi-
cians). Professional ideology in this respect was also reflected in state laws that prevented
corporations from employing physicians. See gneraly Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
Physician Behavior Legal Banie to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L REv. 431,507-18
(1988) (discussing history of corporate practice of medicine doctrine); Jeffrey F. Chase-
Lubitz, Note, The Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modem Health
Care Industhy, 40 VAND. L REV. 445, 458-67 (1987) (examining development of corporate
practice doctrine and recounting history of medical profession's ethical restraints on corpo-
ratepractice).
See STARS, supra note 73, at 385-87; see also Clark C. Havighurst, Why Preserve Private
Health Care Financing?, in AMERICAN HEALTH PoucY 87, 98 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993).
Havighurst argues that payors' passivity was the product of professional ideology. See id.
(*Under the [professional] paradigm the characteristics of medical care are a scientific and
professional matter, to be determined with no more than cursory regard to cost considera-
tions. Accordingly, all important decisions concerning medical care are entrusted exclu-
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The fundamental feature of managed care, however, is the in-
terposition of payors between consumers and providers on the
theory that the payor will organize and manage the delivery of
health care services for the benefit of the consumer. Significantly,
even traditional insurers commonly use managed care techniques
to control costs. As a result, it is now meaningful to speak of sepa-
rate labor and product markets in medical care.' Physician ser-
vices have become but one input into the complex bundle of
health care finance and delivery services sold by most health plans.
This development is most easily seen in the context of "staff
model" HMOs, which employ physicians directly and, in effect,
resell their services on a prepaid basis to HMO members. Instead
of buying discrete medical services directly from a physician for a
negotiated fee, HMO members pay a monthly fee that guarantees
them access to specified medical care if and when it becomes nec-
essary. The product purchased by the consumer is a bundle of
health care finance and delivery services, of which physician ser-
vices are only one component. Thus, a distinction arises between
the physician services labor market, in which the staff model HMO
is one of many purchasers, and the product market, in which con-
sumers buy varying packages of health coverage.
A similar separation of labor and product markets now exists in
most private health plans, including those not generally regarded
as managed care products. Any health plan that negotiates pay-
ment rates with physicians,35 instead of merely reimbursing its
members' expenses, effectively buys physician services as one input
in a package of health care and financial services sold to consum-
ers. This is true even for plans that afford their members substan-
tial choice of provider, such as PPO or POS plans, at least with re-
spect to in-network physicians. While consumers retain the right to
choose their doctor, the doctor has already committed to a dis-
counted payment rate on the theory that the health plan will steer
patients to his or her practice.'3 Moreover, in the context of the
sively to professionals who are accountable only to the medical profession itself or to stan-
dards of its making.") (internal citation omitted).
See Brewbaker, supra note 28, at 129-30.
' Such negotiation might occur directly or through an intermediary such as a physi-
cian network or multispecialty clinic.
" See Brewbaker, supra note 28, at 151. But see Berenson, supra note 81, at 175-76 (not-
ing physician reluctance to drop MCO contracts because of loyalty to patients).
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modem health plan, physicians compete not only for patients but
also for positions as network physicians.
Having identified the relevant labor and product markets, we
can now (1) evaluate the anticompetitive effects of the independ-
ent physician fee schedule and (2) consider whether a less restric-
tive alternative would have been available to our hypothetical un-
ion. Assuming wide participation by independent physicians, the
fee schedule could be expected to have a pronounced effect in the
physician labor market. Price competition among independent
physicians would be suppressed as to the specified fees. In addi-
tion, because independent physicians could not attract business
away from the employed physicians by reducing the prices charged
to MCOs and other payors, price competition between employed
and independent physicians would be suppressed. Presumably,
wage rates and scheduled fees could be kept in an equilibrium de-
signed to prevent payors from forcing the employed and inde-
pendent physicians to compete against each other on the basis of
price.
The changes in the physician labor market occasioned by the
adoption of the fee schedule would tend to have significant effects
in the product market as well. If plans are no longer free to obtain
low prices for their members by negotiating aggressively with phy-
sicians, costs, and thus prices, could be expected to increase.'37
From a health policy perspective, this would be a dramatic and un-
desirable development. Under the statutory exemption, however,
in the absence of a less restrictive means of promoting union ob-
jectives, rising health care costs have little, if any, relevance. It is
well-established that "successful union activity... may have some
influence on price competition [in the product market] by elimi-
nating that part of such competition which is based on differences
in labor standards. """ Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that
eliminating such competition is "the objective of any national labor
organization."'9 The union fee schedule would thus seem to fall
into a category of arrangements the courts have repeatedly ap-
proved - union agreements made in pursuit of their self-interest
See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing HIAA STUDY).
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,503 (1940).
Id. The Apex court went on to suggest that this sort of diminution in competition was
not thought to violate the Sherman Act, even in the absence of the statutory exemption. See
id. at 503-04; see also American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99, 106 (1968); United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 n.2 (1965).
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whose primary effects are felt in the labor market but which inci-
dentally affect product market prices because wage or labor stan-
dard competition has been diminished.
As noted, the final consideration in our analysis of a hypothetical
fee schedule is whether the union's objective might have been ac-
complished through means less restrictive of competition.14 Given
the danger to competition a fee schedule would pose, the range of
services covered by the schedule must be as narrow as possible.
Because the fee schedule would be illegal if developed and imple-
mented by independent physicians acting alone, all terms in the
schedule must bear some relationship to the union's legitimate
interest in protecting the employed physicians' economic fortunes.
A fee schedule that fixed prices for services not provided by em-
ployed physicians would only further the independent physicians'
interest in restraining competition among themselves and not the
union's legitimate objectives.1
2. Collective Bargaining over Nonmembers' Prices
Let us now consider a second hypothetical. Suppose a union of
employed physicians negotiates a CBA with one or more of the
health plans that employ its members. The CBA requires the
health plan to adhere to a minimum fee schedule when it contracts
with nonunion independent physicians. Such an agreement would
benefit union members by diminishing implicit price competition
between the union members and independent physicians.' Be-
cause the agreement includes one or more employers, and does
not concern only labor parties, it is governed under the nonstatu-
tory exemption.
Under the nonstatutory exemption, a CBA is immune from anti-
trust scrutiny if its terms "are intimately related to a mandatory
subject of bargaining and do not have 'a potential for restraining
competition in the business market in ways that would not follow
naturally from elimination of competition over wages and working
" See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616,625 (1975); IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, 255e3.
... See Craver, supra note 95, at 92. Even so, courts should be careful not to exercise too
much hindsight in their scrutiny of union activities.
See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
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conditions.'"1 As with the statutory exemption, the basic question
is whether the restraint of trade effected by the CBA is sufficiently
tethered to the core purposes of the labor laws."'
Under this test, our hypothetical CBA should be exempt from
antitrust scrutiny. The CBA's independent contractor price term is
directly related to employee union member wages, as long as the
specified prices relate to services that are, or could be, provided by
the union, and wages are among the mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining. ' 4 The resulting restrictions on competition in the
relevant labor and product markets likewise follow naturally from
elimination of competition over wages and working conditions.'4
Indeed, a CBA bearing a strong resemblance to our hypothetical
was approved by the Supreme Court in Teamster's Union v. Oliver.'
In most markets today, negotiating a CBA that sets independent
competitors' fees (the second hypothetical) would not likely be as
effective a union strategy as attempting to bring the independent
physicians into the union (the first hypothetical). The CBA strat-
egy would only be effective if the union could engage in multi-
employer bargaining with a substantial portion of the health plans
in the relevant market. Otherwise, the union's attempt to restrict
independent physicians' fees would only put the contracting em-
ployer at a competitive cost disadvantage. On the other hand, if a
substantial proportion of local independent physicians can be
brought into the union's membership and held to a fee schedule,
union members might be effectively insulated from competition.
,' H AMi ACAN BAR ASS'N, ANTrrRusT LAW DIE)vELOpMEnS (FouRTH) 1307 (1997)
(quoting Conneil, 421 U.S. at 635); see also Local Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S.
676 (1965); IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supm note 99,1 256d (noting that some courts apply
three-part test that would exempt collective bargaining agreements if "(1) 'the restraint on
trade affects only the parties'; (2) the agreement 'concerns a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining,' such as wages, hours and conditions of employment; and (3) the agreement 'is
the product of arm's length bargaining.'") (citations and footnotes omitted).
" Cf IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, 1 256 (characterizing "the basic policy
question" as "[w]hich union restraints should be deemed legitimate").
SSee 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
. 358 U.S. 283 (1959). In Oiver, the CBA specifically restricted the terms of the em-
ployer's wage and lease agreements with independent contractor drivers that were effectively
in competition with the union drivers. See id. at 293.
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B. Joint Unions and Competition
The specific competitive effects ofjoint union activity have been
discussed above in connection with the analysis of the statutory and
nonstatutory exemptions. Obviously, the promulgation of a man-
datory fee schedule for independent physician union members
could potentially destroy price competition'E If joint unions be-
come popular, their anticompetitive effects could resemble those
of the proposed legislation considered in Part I. However, joint
union activity should be somewhat less harmful to competition
than blanket statutory immunity because the joint union's re-
straints on its independent contractor members must be closely
tied to the economic interests of its employee members to remain
exempt from antitrust scrutiny.4
Even if joint unions did not attract large numbers of independ-
ent physicians, joint union activity might nevertheless threaten
price competition among nonmember doctors. There is a signifi-
cant danger that price or other terms developed by an employee-
based union in connection with joint union activity could facilitate
collusion among nonmember independent physicians in the
community. Were the contents of union bylaws regarding accept-
able price and nonprice terms in plan/provider contracts made
public, nonunion physicians might adopt them as a benchmark for
tacit agreements about minimum acceptable contract terms.' ° An
agreement about price terms would clearly violate antitrust laws.
Such agreements, however, are notoriously difficult to detect and
prove. The antitrust laws might thus be an inadequate deterrent to
such conduct.
' See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
See supm notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
As long as union membership is limited to employed physicians, it seems unlikely
that physician unions will facilitate collusion, at least between union physicians and inde-
pendent physicians who are ineligible to unionize. One of the main difficulties in organiz-
ing and maintaining a cartel of any sort is arriving at and policing an agreement among
cartel members without being detected. Union wage negotiations are likely to focus on the
salary and benefits paid to employed physicians. Independent physicians, however, do not
receive a salary from the payors with whom they do business but are usually paid either on
the basis of a set fee per service or on the basis of a capitation payment of some sort. The
wage negotiated by the union with one or more employers could thus not serve as an obvi-
ous benchmark for fees negotiated by independent physicians. Any express attempt by
union members and independent physicians to arrive at a fee schedule comparable to the
union wage rate would not only be illegal (assuming the independent physicians were not
union members) but would likely be detectable and thus subject conspirators to legal liabil-
ity.
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III. PHYSICIAN UNIONS AND THE SHAPE OF HEALTH CARE DELIVERY
Thus far, this Article has focused primarily on the effects of phy-
sician unionization on price competition. As we have seen, a sig-
nificant increase in physician union activity would tend to raise
health care costs because collective bargaining would force MCOs
and insurers to increase payments to physicians.' 5' However, physi-
cian unions may also bring about changes in the shape of the
health care delivery system - changes that are potentially even
more costly than the fee increases associated with collective
bargaining.'"
The labor exemption shields most CBA provisions from antitrust
scrutiny. CBA terms are immune as long as they "are intimately
related to a mandatory subject of bargaining and do not have 'a
potential for restraining competition in the business market in
ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competi-
tion over wages and working conditions.'"' 5 The basic question is
whether the competitive restraints the CBA imposes are sufficiently
related to the core purposes of the labor laws.
The nonstatutory exemption undoubtedly shields a great deal of
union activity that could affect the traditional business structure of
tightly integrated HMOs. Unions are clearly entitled to negotiate
with employees over the scope of union work within the employer's
business. Such issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining.54
Thus, for example, a physicians' union would be entitled to restrict
the role of nurse practitioners and other allied health personnel
within a health care institution. Because nurse practitioners per-
form services that are often performed by physicians, any resulting
restriction of competition between physicians and nurse practitio-
ners is related to union interests protected by core labor policies.
A similar analysis would apply to bargaining over physician staff
composition and review procedures.
"' See POSNEXt, supra note 82, §§ 10.10, 11.1 (noting that sellers cannot automatically
pass along cost increases to consumers).
" More than half of the premium increases estimated to occur as a result of the passage
of legislation enabling independent physician unions are the result of projected changes in
utilization patterns that could emerge from collective bargaining over nonfee issues. See
supra note 55 (providing background on HAA Study).
" H AMERICAN BAR ASW'N, supra note 143, at 1307 (quoting Connell Consu. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616,635 (1975)).
' SeFibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,215 (1964).
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The prospects that large physician unions could reassert control
over staffing issues in the American health care industry should be
disturbing to consumers. Like other labor unions, physician un-
ions would no doubt guard the work prerogatives of their members
to the detriment of consumers who might prefer patronizing non-
physician providers for some services. A strong union could insist
that the health plans with which it bargains limit the role of com-
peting professionals, including nurses, optometrists, psychologists,
physical therapists, midwives, and other allied health profession-
als.'m Through the collective bargaining process, physicians could
effectively deny consumers access to competing providers, regard-
less of the relative value of the providers' services.m
Union proponents have also indicated that physician unions are
likely to seek concessions from MCOs on consumer protection is-
sues such as medical necessity review, coverage of specific proce-
dures and tests, a "reasonable layperson" standard for emergency
room care, the provision of information to patients about plan
policies, and economic conflicts between patients and physicians.57
Surprisingly, unions may not need an antitrust exemption when
they bargain over these issues. The labor exemption is only rele-
vant if the underlying conduct would otherwise violate the antitrust
laws. In principal, union members' collective refusal to deal with a
payor unless the payor institute proconsumer policies unrelated to
the physicians' individual competitive interests should violate anti-
trust laws.'56 Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the antitrust au-
thorities would criminally prosecute doctors engaged in such activ-
ity.' " Payors might well have an incentive to pursue damages or an
" Cf. text accompanying notes 69-77 (describing AMA efforts to suppress competition
from nonphysicians).
'" A recent study, for example, suggests that health outcomes of patients whose primary
care is provided by a nurse practitioner are comparable to those of patients that obtain
primary care from a physician. See Mary 0. Mundinger et al., Prima Care Outcomes in Pa-
tients Treated by Nurse Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283 JAMA 59 (2000). But
see Harold C. Sox, IndependentPimary CarePraieby Nuse Practitioners, 283JAMA 106 (2000)
(noting limitations of study).
"' See geensay David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World. Should
Consumers Call 911 ?, 43 VILL. L REV. 409, 418-25 (1999) (describing reform proposals).
L In general, an agreement among competitors restraining the terms on which they
will compete is unlawful if it has no procompetitive purpose or effect See NCAA v. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984).
'" See, e.g., Marilyn Werber Seratini, Physicians Unite!, NAT'L J., June 5, 1999, at 1524,
1528 (reporting FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky's statement that FTC probably would not
bring case against physicians if they boycotted health care plan that insisted they participate
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injunction, but their claims would almost certainly be judged un-
der the rule of reason.'6 The difficulty of obtaining a favorable
judgment under the rule of reason standard and the negative mar-
ket impact of suing a physicians' union over "propatient" demands
would be strong deterrents to litigation. Moreover, some courts
might even conclude that the "worthy purpose" of consumer pro-
tectionjustifies the suppression of competition.
16
1
If one assumes antitrust liability is a live issue, however, the labor
exemption will provide only limited protection for consumer ori-
ented bargaining. The exemption applies most clearly to agree-
ments between unions and employers that relate to mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining - topics related to "wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment."'62 As a general proposition,
mandatory subjects of bargaining relate primarily to the economic
interests of employers and employees, not those of third parties.'6
In addition, policies that relate to employers' core managerial pre-
rogatives are generally not proper subjects of mandatory bargain-
ing.'" Moreover, the fact that consumer-oriented collective bar-
gaining focuses on the health care product market, and not the
labor market, weighs against applying the nonstatutory exemption.
in its full fine of managed care plans, as long as physicians were not trying to increase their
fees).
" The agreement might be characterized as a group boycott, which will be evaluated
under the per se rule if the union has market power. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers v.
Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293 (1985). However, the recent opinion in
Cahfomtia Dena Association v. FC suggests that even a "quick-look" rule of reason analysis
may not suffice where professional groups take action designed to alleviate information
problems in markets for professional services. See526 U.S. 756,771-72 (1999).
,' See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding
precompetitive features of Ivy League financial aid program justified its anticompetitive
effects) (cited with approval in California Dental Ass'n v. FrC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-72 (1999)).
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
See Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168 (1971)
(holding company's policies toward retirees' health plan not mandatory subject of bargain-
ing). Terms affecting third parties are mandatory subjects of bargaining where the third
party's economic interests directly affect the economic fortunes of union members. See
Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293 (1959) (finding that collective
bargaining agreement terms related to prices to be charged by independent contractors who
compete with union drivers were within the scope of NLRA's mandatory bargaining provi-
sions); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1964) (holding that
employer must bargain over replacement ofjanitorial staff with outside contractors).
'" See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 498 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (de-
scribing management decisions that are fundamental to direction of corporate enterprise as
excluded from duty of collective bargaining). See gmeral// Fsbreoard, 379 U.S. at 223 (finding
that some essential management decisions are not subject to collective bargaining).
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Consider three general categories of issues that might be pressed
by consumer-minded union negotiators: (1) contractual coverage
issues, (2) consumer grievance procedures, and (3) issues related
to consumer choice of provider. The contractual coverage issues
would be motivated by concerns similar to those underlying man-
dated benefits legislation. A physicians' union might insist, for
example, that a health plan cover annual mammograms for women
of a certain age or procedures sometimes considered experimen-
tal, such as bone marrow transplant therapy. Such agreements are
unlikely to be sheltered from antitrust scrutiny under the labor
exemption, because there is no apparent link to the physicians'
"wages, hours and... terms and conditions of employment."' In
addition, determining the contours of the products a firm will sell
has been traditionally regarded a managerial prerogative. Finally,
the provisions of the contract between an MCO and its members
are quintessentially product market issues. Importantly, the hypo-
thetical CBA would restrain trade in the product market by restrict-
ing the plan's freedom in offering benefit packages to employers
and other purchasers. To save a product market restraint, the un-
ion must show the restraint's connection with the market for physi-
cian services.'6 No obvious connection exists.
Analyzing bargaining over consumer grievance procedures is
somewhat more complex. Arguably, there is a stronger connection
with physicians' working conditions, because patient grievances are
most likely to arise when health plans resist paying for physician-
recommended treatment. Physicians might credibly argue that an
outside review process could advance their interests as employees,
not just the quality of patient care. A physician that is too aggres-
sive with a corporate medical director in advocating that a patient
receive expensive care might fear reprisals from his employer. In
addition, advocating on behalf of patients for needed treatment
makes the physician's job more difficult; a union might well argue
that physicians' personal interests would be best served by a system
that gave greater deference to the medical opinions of treating
physicians. A CBA implementing changes in the consumer griev-
ance process would restrict the product market in a fashion similar
0 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Physicians might argue that they have professional misgivings
about being associated with a health plan that refuses to pay for adequate coverage for its
members.
'" See supm notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
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to agreements over mandated benefits, but would be legally defen-
sible because its restrictions could be traced to physicians' efforts
to better their own employment conditions.
Unions might also wish to negotiate over consumers' ability to
select the provider of their choice. However, an employed physi-
cians union would be unlikely to seek this privilege on consumers'
behalf because giving plan members freedom to seek physician
services outside of the plan network may threaten the job security
of union members. An independent physicians union, on the
other hand, might well seek great patient freedom in this regard,
assuming union membership includes most physicians in a given
community.' 7
Similarly, if an HMO were to employ unionized primary care
physicians but used a network of independent physicians for spe-
cialist care, the union might negotiate for greater patient access to
non-network specialists, at least if the primary care physicians can
control patient access to specialists. Again, these restrictions would
restrain trade in the product market to some degree, because the
plan must now alter its contracts with consumers and employers to
meet the union requirements. However, greater specialist access
arguably directly benefits union members by reducing patient care
and administrative workload.
Interestingly, independent physician unions could presumably
implement a provider choice term in a CBA with the full protec-
tion of the labor exemption. Independent physicians might well
conclude that it is in their collective economic interest to permit
patients, not health plans, to choose their doctors. And, because,
in a heavily unionized environment, health plans would have diffi-
culty obtaining discounts by contracting selectively with independ-
ent physicians, health plans would have a reduced interest in resist-
ing such a demand. Although the CBA would restrain the product
market, the restriction would have a direct link to the economic
fortunes of the physician union members.
In general, collective bargaining over consumer protection issues
will tend to have the same effects on health care markets as con-
sumer protection legislation does. Increasing health plan benefits,
provider options, and grievance processes unquestionably make
health plans more expensive. Commentators are divided, however,
7 Joint unions, as a matter of law, would be required to favor the interests of the em-
ployee members. See supm notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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over whether the benefits obtained are worth their costs, both in
real dollars and their effects on the affordability of health coverage
at the margins.'6
Consumer protection efforts by labor unions are, however, likely
to have effects that are both broader and narrower than consumer
protection legislation. Particularly if new legislation authorizing
bargaining by independent physicians is enacted, labor union con-
sumer protection efforts are likely to affect the nonprice features
of every health plan offered in a unionized market. Because the
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
has preempted many of the consumer protection statutes enacted
at the state level,U labor unions' efforts could prove to be more
important than state legislative activity. If new legislation is not
enacted, union membership is likely to remain largely limited to
employed physicians, with the result that more tightly integrated
health plans will be more affected by consumer-oriented bargain-
ing than other plans. Such bargaining will tend to diminish what-
ever cost advantages such plans might have enjoyed over their
more loosely organized competitors. This could be significant, not
only in limiting consumers' health plan options but also in remov-
ing a potentially important competitive stimulant to cost-
containment by less-integrated health plans.
If courts permit labor unions to bargain over consumer protec-
tion matters without incurring antitrust liability, it is virtually cer-
tain that such bargaining will become a frequent feature of union
negotiation. A union that can claim to be using the bargaining
process to protect the public might expect considerably more pub-
lic support in a labor dispute than a union whose primary com-
plaint is that their physicians' incomes are too low. It will only be
" See, e.g., David Hyman, Regulating Managed Cam- What's Wrong with a Patient Bill of
Right 73 S. CAL. L REV. 221 (2000) (criticizing "patients bill of rights" proposals); Korob-
kin, supra note 78 (defending proposals).
M See, eg., Prudential Ins. Co. v. National Park Med. Ctr., Inc., 154 F.3d 812, 829 (8th
Cir. 1998) (holding that ERISA preempts state preferred provider regulation); American
Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that ERISA preempts
state mandated benefits statute); Cigna Healthplan v. Louisiana, 82 F.3d 642, 649 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that ERISA preempts "any willing provider" statute); see also Margaret Farrell,
ERISA Prwmption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Fedfalinn, 23
AM.J.L & MED. 251,252 (1997) (arguing that ERISA may prevent effective state-level health
care reform).
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possible to gauge a union's sincerity in pressing for consumer pro-
tections after negotiations are concluded.'70
IV. MANAGERIAL AND SUPERVISORY STATUS OF PHYSICIAN UNION
MEMBERS
As a final matter, it is appropriate to consider the market effects
of the rules that prevent employees that are deemed either "super-
visors" or "managerial employees" from participating in collective
bargaining. Both exceptions result from a concern that the em-
ployer be assured of "the undivided loyalty of its representatives." ",
The supervisor exception appears in the NLRA itself and applies to
employees that exercise authority over other employees in the em-
ployer's interest.7 The court-created managerial employee excep-
tion applies to employees who "formulate and effectuate manage-
ment policies by expressing and making operative decisions of
their employer. 72 Managerial employees are generally "much
higher in the managerial structure" than supervisors;' 74 the courts
have assumed that Congress did not include an explicit managerial
In In some cases, union members' economic interests will coincide easily with consumer
protection rhetoric. See supm text accompanying notes 167-69.
! NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980) (citing Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S.
653, 661-62 (1974) and NRLB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1974)). Judge
Posner has written:
The exclusion of supervisors is one of the brakes [the Taft-Hartley Act imposed on
unionization]. If supervisors were free to form or join unions and enjoy the broad
protection of the Act for concerted activity, the impact of a strike would be greatly
amplified because the company would not be able to use its supervisory personnel
to replace strikers. More important, the company - with or without a strike -
could lose control of its work force to the unions, since the very people in the
company who controlled hiring, discipline, assignments and the other dimensions
of the employment relationship might be subject to control by the same union as
the employees they were supposed to be controlling on the employer's behalf.
We might become a nation of worker-controlled firms. Syndicalism is not the
theory of the amended National Labor Relations Act. Stated less dramatically, al-
lowing supervisors... to bargain collectively could create serious conflicts of in-
terest.
NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465-66 (7th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
' See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1994) (defining supervisor); se also i& § 152(3) (excluding
"supervisors" from definition of "employee").
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 286 (1974) (quoting Palace Laundry
Dry Cleaning Co., 75 N.L.ILB. 320, 323 n.4 (1947)).
" I& at 283.
Unive"ity of California, Davis
employee exception because it was clearly understood that they
were beyond the scope of the NLRA 7 s
A. When Are Physicians Managerial Employees?
Whether physicians will be considered managerial employees
and thus ineligible for collective bargaining will depend on the
degree of influence they exert over the policies of their employers.
In hospitals, for example, physicians typically serve on medical staff
committees that formulate medical policies; in some institutions
these committees have final authority over such matters.76 Other
health care institutions, such as large group practices and HMOs,
likewise employ medical staff committees in the policy formulation
177
process.
The managerial employee exception may prove to be an impor-
tant obstacle to physician unionization. The leading case, NLRB v.
Yeshiva University,'8involved an organizing campaign by the faculty
of Yeshiva University. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the
faculty were managerial employees; the "controlling consideration"
was their "absolute" authority in academic matters.f, As is the case
with many physicians working in health care institutions, the Ye-
shiva faculty were organized into departments and committees that
developed policy on specific issues.'l Significantly, the Court re-
"' See i&L at 283-88 (reviewing legislative history and early NLRB decisions regarding
managerial employees).
', See grenemy William S. Brewbaker 1I1, Antitust Conspirtu Doctrine and the Hospital
Entetrpr*i 74 B.U. L RE'. 67, 76-82 (1994) (describing medical stafi's role in hospital gov-
ernance).
' Indeed, state enabling legislation for HMOs appears to contemplate an internal
quality assurance process based on the hospital model. See National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners, Health Maintenance Organization Model Act § 7 (1991).
7 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
' See i& at 686. The Court described faculty authority in the following terms:
They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to
whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading
policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will
be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion their views have determined
the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a
school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine
decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy ap-
plies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the
terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served.
Id. zeo See id. at 675-77 (describing Yeshiva University's organizational structure).
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jected the NLRB's argument that the faculty should not be consid-
ered managerial employees because the faculty's exercise of ad-
ministrative authority involved "independent professional judg-
ment."'81 Because the faculty effectively determined critical univer-
sity policies, the Court deemed them managerial employees even
though they were expected to draw on professional standards in
making their decisions.8
Yeshiva thus suggests that the more actual influence physicians
exert within an organization, the more likely they are to be re-
garded as managerial employees.'8 Indeed, shortly after the Court
decided Yeshiva, the NLRB refused to permit collective bargaining
by physician employees in a staff-model HMO that delegated sig-
nificant managerial authority to physician-run committees."" The
NLRB found that,
many of the decisions made at the committee level, which include
managing the organization's protocol system, overseeing its
medical records system, setting its medicinal prescription policy,
reviewing and modifying the benefits and working conditions of
its staff, establishing procedures and staff training for medical
emergencies, and minimizing the institution's risk of medical
S -i& at 673.
See id. at 686. The Yeshima Court also made clear that the relevant question is not
whether the employees have the ultimate legal authority to make managerial decisions, but
rather how decisions are actually made within the relevant institution:
[T]he fact that the administration holds a rarely exercised veto power does not
diminish the faculty's effective power in policymaking and implementation. The
statutory definition of "supervisor" expressly contemplates that those employees
who "effectively... recommend" the enumerated actions are to be excluded as
supervisory. Consistent with the concern for divided loyalty, the relevant consid-
eration is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority. That
rationale applies with equal force to the managerial exclusion.
Id. at 685 n.17 (citations omitted).
t Cf. FHP, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1142-43 (1985) (*As professional employees, staff
physicians may also be managerial if their activities on behalf of their employer fall outside
the scope of decision-making routinely performed by similarly situated health care profes-
sionals and that is primarily incident to their treatment of patients").
'" See i& at 1143. The committees on which the physician-employees served included:
peer review committee, physician and therapeutics committee, advisory committee on pro-
vider work environment, emergency services committee, patient services committee, advisory
committee to the board of directors, and ad hoc committees dealing with issues such as
defining the role of the family practitioner or dealing with high-risk pregnancies. See i& at
1142.
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malpractice liability, lie at the core of health maintenance or-
ganization's operations.
Subsequent NLRB rulings have distinguished Yeshiva and per-
mitted physician employees to bargain collectively notwithstanding
the claim that the physicians were managerial employees. In Mon-
tefiore Hospital and Medical C ente, ' which, interestingly, involved
the medical center affiliated with Yeshiva University,'87 the NLRB
distinguished Yeshiva on the ground that hospital policy was effec-
tively made by departmental chairpersons." Although physician
employees participated in a committee structure dealing with is-
sues of hospital policy, their role was largely advisory."*
Although the NLRB and two reviewing federal courts have re-
cently affirmed a regional director's recognition of a physician
employees union, the future of collective bargaining by HMO phy-
sician employees remains open.' 9 Resolution of the question of
physicians' managerial status will be fact specific and will turn on
the degree of control the employed physicians exert over impor-
tant managerial policies. Employers such as HMOs who confer a
great deal of authority on their medical directors are less likely to
successfully argue that other physician employees perform mana-
gerial functions that make them ineligible to bargain collectively. '91
M at 1143.
261 N.LR.B. 569 (1982).
See WuIJAMJ. CURRAN ETAL., HEALTHCARE LAw & EThics 1249 (1998).
See MmtefimHosp., 261 N.LR.B. at 570.
' See i& at 571 ("As a general proposition, the chairmen make every major administra-
tive decision with respect to the operation of their departments that is not dictated from
above. Staff doctors have some input, but this is only in the form of recommendations
which, for the most part, the chairmen or their designees evaluate."); see also Medalia
Healthcare, LLC, No. 19-RC-13554, slip op. at 26-29 (N.LRB. Region 19 Apr. 24, 1998)
(finding that physicians serving on numerous management committees in multispecialty
clinic acted in advisory capacity and were thus not managerial employees); cf. NLRB v. Ye-
shiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 684 n.17 (1983) (noting that Yeshiva University did not argue its
faculty's role in policy making was "merely advisory").
See Thomas-Davis Med. Ctrs., P.C., 324 N.LR.B. 29, 32 (1997) (refusing to address
argument that union doctors are supervisors or managerial personnel in unfair labor prac-
tices proceeding where issue was or could have been litigated in representation proceeding),
nviw denied and enforcement granted Thomas-avis Med. Ctrs., P.C. v. NLRB, 157 F.3d 909
(D.C. Cir. 1998).
'9' Ironically, this also suggests the possibility that a union that successfully uses the
collective bargaining process to obtain greater physician control over medical policymaking
might ultimately lose its protected status under the NLRA.
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B. When Are Physicians Superuisors?
As noted above, the NLRA specifically prevents "supervisors"
from enjoying the benefits otherwise accorded to employees under
the statute.' 92 Section 152(11) of the NLRA defines a supervisor as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer,
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, as-
sign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to di-
rect them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recom-
mend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exer-
cise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the exercise of independentjudgment.'
Pursuant to this definition, the Supreme Court has adopted a
three-part test which considers whether (1) "the employee [has]
authority to engage in 1 of the 12 listed activities,"" (2) "the exer-
cise of that authority requires 'the use of independent judg-
ment,'"" and (3) "the employee hold[s] the authority 'in the in-
terest of the employer.'"" Each of these questions must be an-
swered in the affirmative for the employee in question to be classi-
fied as a supervisor.Y As the definition suggests, classification of
an employee as a supervisor requires a searching inquiry into the
authority the employee exercises within the relevant institution.
Despite the highly fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, some im-
portant generalizations can be made about the application of the
test to employed physicians. To begin, the twelve supervisory ac-
tivities noted in the definition relate primarily to personnel mat-
ters. As a result, the more a physician is involved in hiring, firing,
and scheduling personnel, the more likely it is that he or she will
be deemed a supervisor. For example, if an HMO physician's rec-
ommendation will effectively result in the hiring or dismissal of
nursing or other personnel, the physician will meet the first prong
See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994).
M § 152(11).
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 574 (1994). The
authority must be actual, not merely theoretical. See New York Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 156
F.3d 405, 414 (2d Cir. 1998); Food Store Employees Union, Local 347 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d
685,690 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
m Heah Ca &Re ir Corp., 511 U.S. at 574.
See id. at 573-74.
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of the test9 On the other hand, if the physician's recommenda-
tion is subject to independent evaluation by others, his or her par-
ticipation in the evaluation process will not alone justify supervisory
status. 99
Next, the fact that physicians regularly give directions to nurses
and other health professionals concerning the medical care their
patients should receive does not make them supervisors for pur-
poses of the statute.2 The NLRA specifically contemplates unioni-
zation by professional employees9 ' and expressly acknowledges
'" See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) ("The term 'supervisor' means any individual having author-
ity, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, dis-
charge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees.., or effectvely to recommend such action
... ") (emphasis added).
See Medalia Healthcare, LLC, No. 19-RC-13554, slip op. at 31-32 (NLRB Region 19
Apr. 24, 1998); Gem Urethane Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 1349, 1349 (1987) ("Similarly, the au-
thority to evaluate work performance is not evidence of supervisory status if it is subject to
independent investigation and decision by others."); see also New Yor* Univ. Med. Ct., 156
F.3d at 413 ("Evaluations that do not affect job status of the evaluated person are inadequate
to establish supervisory status."); Highland Superstores Inc. v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 918, 921-22
(6th Cir. 1991) (stating that leadmen's recommendations were insufficient to establish
supervisory status); NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1467 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting that
recommending promotion or discharge does not establish supervisory status); Greenspan,
318 N.L.R.B. 70, 76-77 (1995) (finding compatibility screen does not create supervisory
status); North Gen. Hosp., 314 N.L.R.B. 14, 18 (1994) (noting that recommendation must
be effective to establish supervisory status); Fst W. Bldg. Servs., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 591, 600
(1992) (recognizing power to make recommendation that will not necessarily be followed
does not create supervisory status); General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 859 (1974)
(noting supervisory status not created where co-equals supervise each other intermittently).
But see Legal Aid Soc'y, 324 N.L.R.B. 796, 796-97 (1997) (excluding attorney that supervises
paralegals from collective bargaining).
' As a matter of statutory interpretation, this sort of professional "supervision" should
not constitute the performance of any of the twelve activities enumerated in the NLRA's
definition of "supervisor." See Ra-Cm, 705 F.2d at 1468 (-The licensed practical nurses'
greatest discretion is in deciding which nurse's aide shall do what task, but this discretion is
exercised in accordance with a professional judgment as to the best interests of the patient
rather than a managerial judgment as to the employer's best interests. It is no differentfrom a
doctor's teling his nurses which patients to provide what care to, which is not superision under the
statute?) (emphasis added); Providence Hosp., 320 N.L.R.B. 717, 720-30 (1996) (discussing
similarities of duties of charge nurses and RN's). But see infta text accompanying notes 214-
17 (discussing "independent judgment" prong of statutory test for supervisory status).
SSee 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1994) (defining professional employee); id. § 152(3) (defin-
ing employee). "Professional employee" was defined in order to prevent all highly skilled
and educated workers (such as physicians) from being classified as supervisors under the
NLRA because of the "distinction between authority arising from professional knowledge
and authority encompassing front-line management prerogatives." NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,583 (1994); see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S.
672, 681 n.12 (1980) ("Tlhe [National Labor Relations] Act provides broadly that 'employ-
ees' have organizational and other rights. Section 2(3) defines 'employee' in general terms,
[section] 2(12) defines 'professional employee' in some detail, and [section] 9(b)(1) pro-
hibits the Board from creating a bargaining unit that includes both professional and non-
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that professional work "requires the consistent exercise of discre-
tion and judgment in its performance. "2 Because "most profes-
sionals have some supervisory responsibilities in the sense of direct-
ing another's work - the lawyer his secretary, the teacher his
teacher's aide, the doctor his nurses, the registered nurse her
nurse's aide and so on,""5 a contrary rule would significantly un-
dercut Congress's intention to permit professional employees to
join unions. Although the question has not been squarely pre-
sented in the case of physicians, the Yeshiva Court noted that "only
if an employee's activities fall outside the scope of the duties rou-
tinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be
found aligned with management."" Supervisory status should pre-
vent physicians from participating in union activities only when
those physicians have a substantial decision making role in matters
traditionally associated with the personnel function, such as hiring,
firing, discipline, or scheduling20
In fact, even physicians that have more significant involvement in
personnel matters may not be supervisors under the NLRA. The
NLRB has held that "[t]he issue of supervisory status usually arises
where authority is regularly exercised on the employer's behalf."M
Thus, occasional exercise of supervisory authority need not result
in the exclusion of an employee from a bargaining unit."
professional employees unless a majority of the professionals vote for inclusion.") (citations
omitted)).
'0 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a)(ii).
Ra-Cz, 705 F.2d at 1465.
Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. at 690. The Court further noted with apparent approval the
NLRB's use of a test that asks in each case 'whether the decisions alleged to be managerial
or supervisory are 'incidental to' or 'in addition to' the treatment of patients, a test Congress
expressly approved in 1974. IM at n.30.
w The second and third prongs of the "supervisor" test may create some latitude for
physician participation even in these activities. See infra text accompanying notes 206-14.
But see National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. Cook County, 692 N.E.2d 1253
(M. App. CL 1998).
Adelphi Univ., 195 N.LR.B. 639,644 (1972) (emphasis added).
See id. ("[A] ... conflict of interest is [not] necessarily created whenever persons
occasionally exercise some authority over other employees of the employer."). The NLRB
has prescribed a multifactor test to determine whether an employee's exercise of supervisory
authority necessitates treating the employee as a statutory supervisor. Relevant factors in-
clude "the business of the employer, the duties of the individuals exercising supervisory
authority and those of the bargaining unit employees, the particular supervisory functions
being exercised, the degree of control being exercised over the non-unit employees, and the
relative amount of interest the individuals at issue have in furthering the policies of the
employer as opposed to those of the bargaining unit in which they have been included."
Detroit College of Bus., 296 N.LR.B. 318, 321 (1989); see also Legal Aid Soc'y, 324 N.L.B.
796 (1997); Medalia Healthcare, LLC, No. 19-RC-13554, slip op. at 25 (Apr. 24, 1998).
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The second and third prongs of the test for supervisory status
ask, respectively, whether the employee's exercise of the enumer-
ated supervisory authority requires "the use of independent judg-
ment" and whether the authority is exercised "in the interest of the
employer."' Until recently, the NLRB had held that a health care
professional's "direction of less-skilled employees, in the exercise
of professional judgment incidental to the treatment of patients, is
not authority exercised 'in the interest of the employer'" but rather
in the interest of patient care. "9 The Court rejected this position
in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., holding that "[t]he wel-
fare of the patient. .. is no less the object and concern of the em-
ployer than it is of the nurses."2' The Court noted, however, that
its holding "casts no doubt on Board or court decisions interpret-
ing parts of § 2(11) other than the specific phrase 'in the interest
of the employer. "21
In the wake of Health Care & Retirement Corp., the NLRB changed
its position on the supervisory status of health care professionals."
It still maintains that doctors or nurses that make professional
judgments regarding patient care that result in some incidental
level of supervision are not necessarily not supervisors. However,
the NLRB now bases its conclusion on the second prong of the
test, finding that such direction does not involve "independent
judgment," but is rather an incidental consequence of professional
discretion.
NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,574 (1994).
AL dat 574.
210 1&.
'" Id. at 580.
, Id. at 583.
The NLRB has characterized the "patient care" rule rejected in Health Care & Reti-
meat Cop. as "a tool designed, in part, to avoid the confusing dichotomy between the judg-
ment exercised by all nurses due to their professional or technical training and the exercise
of independentjudgment by a supervisor." Providence Hosp., 320 N.LIR.B. 717, 726 (1996).
" Sm id. at 729; Ten Broeck Commons, 320 N..ILB. 806, 810 & n.7 (1996); ser also
Memorandum OM 99-44 (Aug. 24,1999) (NLRB Guidance Memorandum on Charge Nurse
Supervisory Issues), repinW in 8 Health L Rep. (BNA) 1459 (1999). It remains to be seen
whether the NLRB's new position will fare better in the courts than the "patient care" rule
rejected in Health Care &irvinent Coyp. See Beverly Enters., Va., Inc. v. NLRB 165 F.3d 290,
298 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that nurses exercised independent judgment); Mid-America
Care Found. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Passavant Retirement &
Health Ctr. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 243,248-49 (3d Cir. 1998) (same); Mid-America Care Found.
v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 638, 640-41 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); see also NLRB v. Grancare, Inc., 170
F.3d 663, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (finding that nurses exercised independent
judgment); Beverly Enters., Minn., Inc. v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1042, 1046-48 (8th Cir. 1998)
(finding no exercise of independentjudgment); Beverly Enters., Pa., Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d
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Whether the courts ultimately sustain the NLRB's position
should have little consequence for the ability of most employed
physicians to participate in physician unions. If the NLRB's expan-
sive reading of "independent judgment" is upheld, even physicians
with some significant supervisory authority over other health care
personnel may not be excluded from collective bargaining. 5 On
the other hand, even if the Court rejects the NLRB's position, phy-
sicians' traditional authority to issue orders to nurses and others in
connection with patient care plans should not be considered "as-
signment" or "responsible supervision" under the NLRA. More-
over, physicians and nurses typically operate under separate lines
of employment authority.1 6 Only when a physician is an effective
participant in "recruiting, hiring, scheduling, and the other cate-
gories of supervisory responsibility" should his or her ability to par-
ticipate in collective bargaining potentially be compromised. 7
C. Implications for Competition
The labor laws that prohibit the participation of managerial em-
ployees and supervisors in collective bargaining are unlikely to
produce substantial effects on competition in health care markets.
1269, 1270-71 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same); Caremore, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir.
1997) (same); Providence Alaska Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 121 F.3d 548, 552-55 (9th Cir. 1997)
(same). On its face, the "blanket assertion" that direction of other employees resulting from
professional judgments about patient care does not satisfy the "independent judgment7
requirement bears a striking resemblance to the NLRB's failed attempt to argue that such
judgments could never be made "in the interest of the employer." Health Care & Retireent
Corp., 511 U.S. at 577-78; see also Caremore, 129 F.3d at 371 ("Ihe NLRB's position generally
has been that supervisory status is almost never to be accorded nurses whose supervisory
authority is exercised . . . in the interest of patient care."). Nevertheless, as noted above,
some courts have deferred to the NLRB's interpretation of the statute and upheld findings
that health care professionals did not exercise "independent judgment" in supervising less-
skilled workers. Cf. Beerly Ente,, Pa., 165 F.3d at 302 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (characteriz-
ing NLRB's position as "that the judgment exercised by [professional nurses] in exercising
their incidental supervisory authority over [nurse's aides] is not the 'independent judgment
concerned with management prerogatives that is contemplated by § 2(11), but is more
properly viewed as 'professional judgment' exercised in getting their assigned work done
with the assistance of [nurse's aides] employed specifically for that purpose.").
. See Memorandum OM 99-44, supra note 214, at 1461-63 (discussing application of
"independent judgment" test).
,See New York Univ. Med. Ctr. v. NLRB, 156 F.3d 405, 412 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
physicians and other medical professionals such as nurses "functioned within their own,
entirely separate, lines of authority").
"' I& But see i& at 412 n.2 (suggesting possibility that unit chief physicians had supervi-
sory authority over residents); National Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees v. Cook
County, 692 N.E.2d 1253, 1258-62 (M. App. CL 1998) (holding that attending physicians in
teaching hospital are residents' supervisors).
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To begin, the rules only come into play if a physician is an em-
ployee under the NLRA. Assuming that collective bargaining
rights continue to be extended only to employees, physician un-
ions would be unlikely to exert a significant competitive effect in
most markets in the near term even were all eligible physicians to
2181join a union. Thus, excluding some portion of those physicians
eligible to bargain on the ground that they are supervisors or
managerial employees should generally make little competitive
difference.
Two additional points bear mentioning, however. First, as al-
ready noted, if the statutory definition of supervisory authority
were interpreted to include the direction physicians routinely give
to other health professional regarding patient care, virtually no
physician would be eligible to bargain. Such a decision would ef-
fectively end collective bargaining by physician unions and, as a
result, any adverse competitive effects that might be expected. It
would also contravene the structure of the NLRA, which explicitly
contemplates unionization by "professional employees."
21 9
Second, the judicially created exception for managerial employ-
ees suggests that employed physicians will lose their eligibility to
bargain if they are given effective decision making authority over
core institutional policies. This exclusion might turn out to be
particularly significant in cases where a physician has sold his or
her medical practice to a hospital or physician practice manage-
ment company. In such cases, the physician may well be an em-
ployee but may have negotiated an agreement that gives her effec-
tive day-to-day control over policies and personnel. Moreover, an
employer facing a genuine prospect of union organizing might
possibly blunt a union drive by giving staff doctors greater power to
set medical policy within the organization.m Such a decision might
remove some portion of the motivation for the union as well as
facilitate a legal challenge to the union's operation.
CONCLUSION
The physician union movement presents legislators and judges
with a number of important policy decisions. First and foremost,
2 See supra note 89.
See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
See Hirshfeld, supra note 23, at 52-53.
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Congress and state legislatures must decide whether to change cur-
rent law to permit independent physicians to bargain collectively
with health plans. I have argued that enhancing the bargaining
rights of independent physicians would probably harm most con-
sumers. Indeed, given the magnitude of the costs the union
movement will likely impose on consumers, it is more than a little
ironic that physicians have assumed an altruistic posture in the un-
ionization debate. Competition in health care markets is the de
facto health policy in the United States, and, whatever its defects,
price competition has played a large part in the U.S. health care
industry's success in curbing inflation in recent years. Depending
on the permissiveness of the legal rules that govern them, physi-
cian unions threaten to end price competition among doctors and
have a chilling effect on nonprice competition among health plans
as well.
The need for countervailing economic power in health care
markets is not a compelling argument for increased union activity.
Organized medicine is certainly correct in asserting that an anti-
trust policy that allows health plans to exercise monopsony pur-
chasing power is bad for consumers, because unduly low prices will
tend to suppress the output and quality of health care services. But
even if monopsony is a real problem, the appropriate response to it
is aggressive antitrust enforcement, not inviting physicians in every
American market to set their fees on a collective basis.
Even if one agrees that consumers are in significant need of pro-
tection from their health plans, it does not follow that physicians
are the ones to protect them. For a significant portion of the twen-
tieth century organized medicine was in substantial control of the
health care industry. During this period physician leaders talked a
great deal about protecting patient interests but instead created a
system that was guided by the economic interests of doctors. Al-
though the political process is far from perfect, legislators, at least
at the state level, have demonstrated a considerable willingness to
regulate all aspects of managed care operations. Physicians can
and should look out for their patients' medical interests. But, in
light of their track record, consumers' interests are more likely to
be protected if binding decisions about the shape of health care
delivery are made in institutions, such as legislatures and markets,
in which consumers are at least nominally represented.
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Courts will also likely make crucial decisions affecting the future
of physician bargaining. Even if Congress and the states refuse to
change current law, a number of significant questions will remain
to be answered. These include the scope of employed physicians'
bargaining rights,2' unions' ability to bargain over consumer pro-
tection issues that do not affect physicians' direct economic inter-
ests,n and whether employed and independent physicians may
band together in joint unions.m Resolution of these issues will
have important consequences for consumers.
Indeed, Congress and the states appear to be considering pre-
cisely the wrong sort of physician union legislation. As this Article
illustrates, the labor laws may already permit physicians (including
independent physicians) to engage in a surprising range of collec-
tive action strategies. At this point, it remains to be seen how much
latitude courts will give physician unions in using these strategies.
There is a clear danger, however, that independent physicians,
having so far lost their battles for organizing rights in Congress,
may yet obtain those rights in court. Judges interpreting the labor
laws may well fail to take into account either the absence of any
compelling distributive justifications for union activity or the dan-
gers physicians' collective action could pose to consumer interests.
The public interest may ultimately be best served not by legislation
expanding physicians' bargaining rights, but rather by legislation
to ensure that the medical profession cannot use the labor laws to
re-institute wholesale professional control over the American
health care system.
=' See supra Part IV (discussing managerial and supervisory status).
" SeesuprPart II.
See supra Part III.
